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The Sexual Harassment Loophole
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter
Abstract
Employers rarely pay for sexual harassment. The #MeToo
movement has not changed this legal reality. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964—the nation’s primary workplace
antidiscrimination law—contains a harassment loophole.
Harassment is the only kind of Title VII violation that allows
employers to avoid liability if they offer training and reporting
opportunities to workers. In contrast, employers must
automatically pay for all other Title VII claims such as
discriminatory firings, even when firms have trained their
employees not to discriminate. This Article makes the case for
closing the loophole by aligning harassment liability with other
Title VII offenses and holding employers automatically
responsible for all proven incidents of workplace harassment.
When the Supreme Court created the harassment loophole
years ago, it assumed that employers would enact workplace
measures to effectively deter harassment. Unfortunately, the
#MeToo movement has convincingly demonstrated that the
problem of workplace harassment remains widespread despite
decades of harassment training. Even though firms express a
rhetorical commitment to antiharassment values, many
employers engage only in cosmetic compliance and fail to take
meaningful steps to actually curb harassment. Closing the
harassment loophole would not only represent a tangible legal
Professor of Law, Willamette University. J.D., Stanford University. I
am grateful to Caroline Davidson, Paul Diller, Nancy Dowd, Andrew Gilden,
Deborah Rhode, Justin Simard, and Elizabeth Tippett for helpful
conversations and input on this Article. In addition, Christina Luedtke and
Nicholas Peasley provided outstanding research assistance throughout this
project. Finally, I greatly appreciate the excellent library research support
that I received from Mary Rumsey.
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solution to the ongoing problem of harassment, it would also
advance the goals of compensation, deterrence, and
cost-spreading that lie at the core of Title VII. Just as companies
must pay for all other Title VII violations—regardless of formal
policies that prohibit misconduct—courts should hold firms
strictly accountable for sexual harassment.
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INTRODUCTION
Employers rarely pay for sexual harassment.1 The #MeToo
movement has not changed this legal reality.2 Since #MeToo
began several years ago, the movement has raised awareness
about sexual misconduct and empowered victims to come
forward.3 Survivors have told their stories about workplace
abuse, and employers have fired many high-profile men.4 But
despite #MeToo’s initial wave of consciousness-raising, the
movement has said very little about the actual law that governs
workplace harassment: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5
In light of this vacuum, a vital question still looms over the
movement: Will #MeToo continue to operate primarily as a
social movement, or will it transform into a legal movement that
effectively combats sexual harassment?6
1.
2.
3.

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part I.B.
See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128
YALE L.J.F. 22, 25 (2018) (discussing how the #MeToo movement has
facilitated solidarity among victims).
4. See Melissa Murray, Consequential Sex: #MeToo, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, and Private Sexual Regulation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 825, 832–33
(2019) (explaining how #MeToo advocates criticize the state for failing to
adequately combat harassment).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17; see Lesley Wexler et al., #MeToo,
Time’s Up, and Theories of Justice, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 53 (discussing the
need for deeper cultural and structural changes in the wake of #MeToo); Rafia
Zakaria, The Legal System Needs to Catch Up with the #MeToo Movement,
NATION (Apr. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/U76J-XAR7 (calling for a broader
discussion of legal reforms within the #MeToo movement).
6. See L. Camille Hébert, Is “MeToo” Only a Social Movement or a Legal
Movement Too?, 22 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 321, 324 (2018) (examining
unanswered questions about #MeToo’s impact); see also Tristin K. Green, Was
Sexual Harassment Law a Mistake? The Stories We Tell, 128 YALE L.J.F. 152,
167 (2018) (discussing the need for legal reforms to combat workplace
harassment); Deborah L. Rhode, #MeToo: Why Not? What Next, 69 DUKE L.J.
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Despite the harrowing stories of many #MeToo victims, the
unfortunate truth is that most of their claims would fail in court
because federal law largely immunizes employers from sexual
harassment liability.7 Even when plaintiffs can prove that they
were sexually assaulted or harassed at work, companies can
avoid paying for this misconduct if they implemented
antiharassment training and corrective procedures.8 This
defense—that firms can escape liability by instituting internal
reporting schemes—is unique to harassment law and does not
apply to other Title VII violations such as discriminatory
discharges.9
In contrast to the law’s take on sexual harassment—where
victims must first utilize their employers’ reporting systems to
obtain relief—Title VII holds firms automatically responsible
for all other claims, regardless of an employer’s internal

377, 379–80 (2019) (examining the #MeToo movement’s ability to catalyze
“lasting change”).
7. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Ending Harassment by Starting with
Retaliation, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 49, 49–50 (2018) (examining various
reasons why most #MeToo harassment claims would fail in court); Julia
Jacobs, #MeToo Cases’ New Legal Battleground: Defamation Lawsuits, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2020), https://perma.cc/UCL3-WS2M (describing common law
claims that plaintiffs bring in lieu of harassment and other time-barred
claims); Jodi Kantor, #MeToo Called for an Overhaul. Are Workplaces Really
Changing?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/YVE3-PXHN
(discussing the “giant holes in the federal laws meant to protect women from
harassment”).
8. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998)
(stating that the failure by an employee to comply with a company’s
antiharassment procedures “will normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s
burden”); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (noting
that basing employer liability on a company’s efforts to create antiharassment
policies would advance Title VII’s goals); see also Susan Bisom-Rapp, Sex
Harassment Training Must Change: The Case for Legal Incentives for
Transformative Education and Prevention, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 62, 66–67
(2018) (examining vicarious liability rules for hostile work environment
claims).
9. See Susan Grover, After Ellerth: The Tangible Employment Action in
Sexual Harassment Analysis, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 809, 809–11 (2002)
(noting that harassment constitutes the sole exception to the rule that holds
employers vicariously liable for antidiscrimination violations).
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procedures or fault.10 For example, if a supervisor violates Title
VII by refusing to hire a non-white applicant, a rule of strict
vicarious liability11 would hold the employer responsible for the
supervisor’s racist act, regardless of the employer’s fault.12 Even
if the company had explicitly prohibited race-based
decision-making and had no knowledge of the supervisor’s
misconduct, the company would still have to pay.13 Likewise, if
a bigoted manager fires an employee because of her religion or
sex in violation of Title VII, courts would hold the company
automatically responsible.14 For liability purposes, it would not
matter whether the company offered anti-bias training or
whether the victim reported the violation to her employer.15
Title VII contains a sexual harassment loophole. By
“loophole,” I mean that there is only one type of Title VII

10. See J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment
Discrimination Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 273, 280–82 (1995) (contrasting Title VII’s
rule of strict employer liability for discrimination with the rule of notice-based
liability for harassment).
11.
“Vicarious liability” imposes legal responsibility on one party for the
wrongful acts of another. See Alan Q. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious
Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related
Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 563 (1988). In the workplace context,
if courts hold employers vicariously liable for employees’ unlawful behavior,
the liability is “strict” or “automatic” in the sense that employers cannot escape
legal responsibility for the employees’ acts by proving that employers exercised
reasonable care to prevent the unlawful behavior. Id. at 577 (discussing the
relationship between “strict” and “vicarious” liability for sexual harassment
claims); see infra Part III.A.
12. See Theresa M. Beiner, Using Evidence of Women’s Stories in Sexual
Harassment Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 117, 144 (2001)
(questioning the value of giving employers an affirmative defense to
harassment claims based on training and reporting procedures).
13. See Verkerke, supra note 10, at 280–82 (describing the different
metrics used to evaluate employer liability for discrimination and
harassment).
14. See id. at 281–82 (outlining liability standards for workplace
discrimination).
15. See Maria M. Carrillo, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment by a
Supervisor Under Title VII: Reassessment of Employer Liability in Light of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 74–75 (1992)
(criticizing the differential treatment of harassment liability versus other
forms of Title VII liability).
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violation—harassment16—that allows employers to avoid
liability by offering training and reporting opportunities to their
workers.17 This Article makes the case for closing the loophole
by aligning harassment liability with other antidiscrimination
offenses and holding employers automatically responsible for all
proven incidents of sexual harassment.
The Supreme Court created the harassment loophole in
1998 by announcing two landmark decisions that functionally
granted immunity to employers with antiharassment policies
and reactive procedures.18 Since then, consultants and human
resources departments have bombarded firms with advice on
how to reduce their legal exposure to harassment claims, even
though there is very little social science data to prove that these
policies actually reduce harassment.19 Nevertheless, the Court
assumed that reporting schemes would effectively curb
harassment.20 Scholars have criticized the Court’s holdings on

16. This Article addresses harassment based on sex and gender only.
Title VII also prohibits harassment based on other protected categories such
as race, religion, and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The judicial
development of these other forms of harassment took different trajectories
during the 1970s. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent
Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 951–92 (1993) (discussing the early
history of harassment claims under Title VII). More recently, courts have
applied identical rules of vicarious liability to all forms of harassment. See L.
Camille Hébert, Analogizing Race and Sex in Workplace Harassment Claims,
58 OHIO ST. L.J. 819, 849 (1997) (outlining the legal parallels between sexual
and racial harassment claims).
17. See supra notes 9–15 and accompanying text.
18. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (announcing the standard for employer
liability in sexual harassment cases); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 (same).
19. See ANNA-MARIA MARSHALL, CONFRONTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THE
LAW AND POLITICS OF EVERYDAY LIFE 15 (2016) (examining the proliferation of
antiharassment consulting firms).
20. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998)
(discussing Title VII’s objectives of “promo[ting] conciliation rather than
litigation” and “encourag[ing] employees to report harassing conduct”);
Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies:
Vicarious Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 755, 787–88 (1999) (analyzing incentives related to
antiharassment policies).
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both empirical and doctrinal grounds.21 This Article advances
these critiques in light of #MeToo and explains how the
movement underscores the ineffectiveness of current
antiharassment procedures. Over two decades after the Court
bet that reporting systems would limit harassment, the sheer
number of #MeToo stories shows that sexual misconduct
continues to proliferate throughout American workplaces
despite years of antiharassment education and internal
reporting schemes.22 Today, the unfortunate reality is that too
many companies engage in performative acts of “cosmetic
compliance” that formally adhere to the Court’s mandate
without meaningfully reducing harassment.23
Courts defend the harassment loophole by pointing to Title
VII’s language, which extends liability only to “employers”
based on the acts of their “agents.”24 Interpreting this text, the
21. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Two Very Different Stories: Vicarious
Liability Under Tort and Title VII Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315, 1324–25 (2014)
(asserting that vicarious liability for harassment applies to only a small set of
cases); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 787–88 (questioning whether
harassment victims would be more likely to raise complaints based on changes
to vicarious liability rules); Anne Lawton, The Bad Apple Theory in Sexual
Harassment Law, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 817, 860 (2005) [hereinafter Lawton,
Bad Apple Theory] (critiquing Title VII’s liability framework for misapplying
agency principles); Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The
Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197,
206–10 (2004) [hereinafter Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum]
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s vicarious liability rules have not reduced
supervisory harassment).
22. See Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final
Triumph of Form over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 3 (2003) (asserting that many employers implement
antiharassment trainings to avoid liability, rather than to reduce
harassment).
23. See Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo
Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV. 229, 243 (2018) (discussing how the #MeToo
movement has shed light on the failures of internal reporting systems).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (“The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and
any agent of such a person.”); see also Chamallas, supra note 21, at 1318–19
(discussing the statutory justifications for the harassment loophole). Courts
have largely declined to hold individuals personally liable for Title VII
harassment claims. See Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment
and Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1583, 1606–07 (2018) (“[I]ndividuals
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Supreme Court has held that only supervisors are “agents” for
Title VII purposes and that supervisory misconduct attaches to
firms only when supervisors take “tangible employment actions”
such as hiring and firing.25 But these holdings reflect an
outdated view of agency law. In fact, outside the harassment
context, courts often hold employers vicariously liable (i.e.,
legally responsible regardless of company fault) for the
misconduct of ordinary employees as agents (i.e., not just
supervisors) for all sorts of misconduct (i.e., not just firings).26
To use a classic example, if a delivery driver runs a red light and
injures a pedestrian, the driver’s employer must pay for the
damages, even if the employee was not a supervisor and even if
the employee broke a workplace rule that explicitly prohibited
bad driving.27 Beyond mere negligence, many jurisdictions
require employers to pay even for some acts of intentional
employee misconduct.28 Employers must compensate victims for
these harms not because the employers engaged in wrongdoing
but because the employee’s misconduct relates to work activities
and foreseeable wrongs.29

who commit sexual harassment generally will be immune from personal
liability under Title VII.”).
25. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 431–32 (2013).
26. See Martha Chamallas, Vicarious Liability in Torts: The Sex
Exception, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 133, 136 (2013) (noting that courts can hold
employers vicariously liable for employee misconduct even when employees
break work rules); Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability
Under Agency Principles: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1244–45 (1991) (noting that workers who are
labeled “employees,” “supervisors,” or “managers” can expose their employers
to vicarious liability).
27. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating:
Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their
Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 138–39 (1995) (discussing various
common law scenarios involving vicarious liability).
28. See Verkerke, supra note 10, at 292–93 (examining situations in
which courts hold defendants vicariously responsible for intentional
misconduct).
29. See David B. Oppenheimer, Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment by Supervisors, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 272,
274 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) (discussing
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Just as courts hold employers strictly liable for careless
delivery drivers under agency law and racist hiring managers
under Title VII, they should hold companies strictly liable for
sexual harassment as well. Although some legal scholars have
proposed expanding this type of vicarious responsibility when
supervisors commit sexual harassment,30 this Article goes
further and argues that today’s workplace realities, as revealed
by #MeToo, justify requiring employers to pay for all forms of
employee harassment, both coworker harassment and
supervisory harassment alike.31 The #MeToo movement has
shown that harassment by fellow employees remains an
unacceptably common event.32 Given the breadth of the
problem, employers should bear the costs of this frequent,
predictable form of employee mistreatment.
Requiring employers to pay for all instances of employee
harassment—whether
committed
by
supervisors
or
coworkers—would advance the goals of compensation,
deterrence, and cost-spreading that lie at the core of Title VII

rationales for holding employers strictly liable for intentional employee
misconduct).
30. See, e.g., Carrillo, supra note 15, at 52 (emphasizing the need for
courts to treat the harms caused by sexual harassment as seriously as other
forms of discrimination); Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite Is Free:
Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 735–36
(2000) (arguing for strict employer liability for supervisory harassment, but
for limiting damages when plaintiffs fail to mitigate); Phillips, supra note 26,
at 1268–69 (asserting that strict employer liability for supervisory harassment
provides the greatest incentive for employers to implement effective
antiharassment programs).
31. For pre-#MeToo scholarship that argued in favor of establishing
vicarious liability for supervisory and coworker harassment, see, e.g.,
Chamallas, supra note 21, at 1343–44 (arguing for new legislation to expand
employer liability to all discriminatory acts that employees commit); Fisk &
Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 789 (describing the prevention of harassment
as a non-delegable employer duty); Oppenheimer, supra note 27, at 107–18
(advocating for strict employer liability for coworker harassment based on
agency principles).
32. See Anita Hill, Let’s Talk About How to End Sexual Violence, N.Y.
TIMES (May 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/Q7DQ-TD65 (explaining how #MeToo
highlighted the experience of millions of sexual abuse survivors).
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and agency law.33 For instance, a rule of strict employer liability
would increase the chances that #MeToo victims would receive
payment for their injuries, thus advancing Title VII’s
compensation objective.34 Automatic liability would also serve
Title VII’s deterrence goal by creating additional incentives for
employers to implement tailored preventative measures that
actually curb sexual misconduct rather than engaging in
cosmetic compliance.35 As to the issue of cost-spreading, it might
seem unfair to force employers to assume the risks and losses
associated with all forms of employee harassment, especially
when firms take genuine steps to reduce harassment by
implementing training and reporting systems. But as courts
have decided in other vicarious liability contexts, when
companies reap the economic benefits of their activities, society
expects them to pay for the foreseeable costs of employee
misbehavior, even when that misconduct violates explicit
workplace rules.36
Critics could raise several objections to this proposal. For
example, expanded employer liability might cause male
managers to avoid interacting with female subordinates, limit

33. See Carrillo, supra note 15, at 85–86 (discussing the relationship
between vicarious liability and Title VII’s core objectives); Chamallas, supra
note 26, at 150–51 (outlining the role vicarious liability plays in distributing
losses); Grossman, supra note 30, at 721–22 (examining Title VII’s twin goals
of compensation and deterrence).
34. See Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment Under
Title VII: A Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 41, 58–59 (1999) (discussing Title VII’s twin objectives of compensating
victims and preventing future acts of discrimination).
35. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998)
(emphasizing the importance of prevention in Title VII’s statutory scheme);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (expressing hope
that the harassment loophole would further Title VII’s “deterrent purpose”);
see also Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum, supra note 21, at 200
(noting that the Supreme Court emphasized Title VII’s deterrence objective
when it created the harassment loophole).
36. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Employer Liability for Sexual
Harassment—Normative, Descriptive, and Doctrinal Interactions: A Reply to
Professors Beiner and Bisom-Rapp, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 169, 196
(2001) (discussing situations where employers must pay for employee
misconduct).

SEXUAL HARASSMENT LOOPHOLE

165

the due process rights of accused harassers, or force firms to pay
for minor misconduct, all while failing to address Title VII’s
other structural deficiencies.37 Despite the facial appeal of these
concerns, however, closing the harassment loophole represents
a vastly preferable alternative to the status quo.
First, if strict vicarious liability caused some employees to
avoid accusations of harassment by limiting their contact with
female coworkers, this marginalization would constitute a
separate Title VII violation.38 Although such claims of exclusion
are notoriously difficult to prove, if closing the harassment
loophole actually caused more supervisors to block women from
networking and advancement opportunities, the chances of
highlighting these violations would increase as unlawful
occurrences became more prevalent.39 To the extent that Title
VII might fail to correct informal or opaque exclusionary
practices, such an outcome would simply highlight the existing
limitations of antidiscrimination law—it would not provide a
rationale for continuing to limit employers’ exposure to
harassment claims.
Second, as to the rights of accused harassers, heightened
liability would actually increase the likelihood of a fair
investigation.40 Today, firms often take advantage of the
harassment loophole by summarily firing alleged perpetrators
to publicly exhibit their commitment to antiharassment
37. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 8, at 69–70 (examining the possible
unintended consequences of uncritically embracing proposals for expanded
harassment training); Hemel & Lund, supra note 24, at 1592 (outlining certain
backlash concerns with expanding corporate liability for sexual misconduct).
38. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 817 (1991)
(discussing the evolution of sex discrimination and harassment claims under
Title VII); Joan C. Williams & Suzanne Lebsock, Now What?, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Jan. 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/JT9Q-XJU5 (noting that a manager’s refusal
to hold closed-door meetings with women would violate Title VII if the same
manager held such meetings with men).
39. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE
L.J. 728, 805 (2011) (discussing the difficulty of combating subtle acts of
discrimination);
Susan
Sturm,
Second
Generation
Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 468 (2001)
(explaining how antidiscrimination law frequently fails to combat patterns of
interaction that exclude nondominant groups over time).
40. See infra Part I.A.1.
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values.41 But if courts were to hold companies automatically
liable for all employee harassment, regardless of subsequent
disciplinary measures, then employers would actually have
fewer incentives to arbitrarily discharge accused harassers until
such allegations were proven.42 At the same time, victims and
firms would still retain incentives to participate in
investigations because, although courts would hold firms
automatically responsible for damages regardless of notice, the
amount of those damages would depend on site-specific facts,
such as whether the company effectively reduced
harassment-related harms after they were unearthed.43 Finally,
even with strict liability in place, harassment law would still
retain many doctrinal safeguards to limit frivolous claims.44
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I critically evaluates
the #MeToo movement’s legal impact by assessing several
post-#MeToo judicial opinions that have dismissed plaintiffs’
allegations of sexual harassment. These very recent federal
decisions show how employers continue to rely on the
harassment loophole to avoid Title VII liability, even in the
wake of #MeToo. Part II explains how the Supreme Court first
created the harassment loophole by embracing the assumption
that limited liability would prompt employers to adopt effective
reporting schemes. But given that #MeToo has undermined this
assumption, Part III explains why a scheme that holds
employers strictly liable for employee harassment would better
comport with the text, purpose, and structure of Title VII, as
well as underlying agency rationales. The Article concludes by
responding to several possible objections.

41. See Ramit Mizrahi, Sexual Harassment Law After #MeToo: Looking
to California as a Model, 128 YALE L.J.F. 121, 133–34 (2018) (explaining how
employers often take immediate corrective action against harassers who are
viewed as “fungible”).
42. Cf. Porter, supra note 7, at 60 (noting that the harassment loophole
can incentivize sudden employee terminations).
43. See Grossman, supra note 30, at 735–36 (arguing for a strict liability
approach to supervisory harassment that would allow for reduced damages
when firms respond effectively to complaints).
44. Chamallas, supra note 21, at 1344.
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Even when employees repeatedly grope, ridicule, or demean
coworkers because of their gender, employers nearly always
avoid liability.45 The #MeToo movement has convincingly
demonstrated that despite firms’ rhetorical commitment to
antiharassment values, the problem of workplace harassment
remains widespread.46 Closing the harassment loophole
represents a tangible legal solution to this problem. Just as
companies
must
pay
for
all
other
Title
VII
violations—regardless of formal policies that prohibit
misconduct—courts should hold firms strictly accountable for
sexual harassment.
I.

THE #METOO MOVEMENT’S EFFECT ON HARASSMENT LAW

The #MeToo movement has revealed two stubborn realities
about sexual harassment in American workplaces. First, despite
a decades-long federal prohibition against harassment, many
women and a significant number of men47 still experience high
levels of gender-based harassment at work.48 Second, the
movement has given victims an opportunity to end years of
silence and openly share harrowing stories of sexual

45. See Estrich, supra note 38, at 844 (noting that courts have limited
Title VII’s reach “to only the most extreme cases of sexual harassment”);
Grover, supra note 9, at 824–25 (summarizing studies that show how
employers win when they utilize the harassment loophole).
46. See Hill, supra note 32 (discussing the prevalence of sexual
harassment in the wake of #MeToo).
47. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 8, at 62–63 (questioning the effectiveness
of antiharassment trainings standing alone); Vicki Schultz et al., Open
Statement on Sexual Harassment from Employment Discrimination Law
Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 25–26 (2018) (explaining that male
harassment victims are typically harassed by other men).
48. See EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGES ALLEGING
SEX-BASED HARASSMENT (CHARGES FILED WITH EEOC) FY 2010–FY 2019
(2019), https://perma.cc/498R-5G2X (reporting that nearly 85 percent of
harassment charges were filed by women in fiscal year 2018); see also MAYA
RAGHU & JOANNA SURIANI, #METOOWHATNEXT: STRENGTHENING WORKPLACE
SEXUAL HARASSMENT PROTECTIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY 1 (2017), https://
perma.cc/6W9Z-BM72 (PDF) (summarizing sexual harassment charge
statistics).
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mistreatment.49 This section considers how the two realities
revealed by the movement—prevalent harassment and
prevalent silence—relate to the current legal regulation of
sexual harassment at work. In short, #MeToo has uncovered a
fundamental mismatch between the requirements of Title VII
and the reality of ongoing sexual harassment. Whereas Title VII
rewards employers that provide antiharassment training to
their workers, harassment remains widespread even with
anti-bias schemes in place.50 Likewise, the #MeToo movement
has explained why credible fears of retaliation cause many
victims to stay silent.51 And yet the law of sexual harassment
still requires victims to quickly speak out about their
harassment experiences or risk losing in court.52 To illustrate
how the #MeToo movement has failed to disrupt these
dynamics, this section concludes by critically evaluating several
post-#MeToo judicial decisions that have utilized the
harassment loophole to dismiss Title VII complaints.
A.

#MeToo, Backlash, and Calls for More Training

Although sexual assault survivors used the phrase “me too”
as early as 2006,53 the modern iteration of the #MeToo

49. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could
Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/SX29-L83N (concluding that
“[m]any survivors realistically judged reporting pointless”).
50. See Robin West, Manufacturing Consent, BAFFLER (May 15, 2018),
https://perma.cc/62TA-SYKW (questioning why a legal norm does not yet exist
to effectively curb harassment).
51. See Mizrahi, supra note 41, at 125 (reporting data on retaliation
against harassment complainants).
52. See Grossman, supra note 30, at 700–03 (discussing how silence or
delayed reporting can defeat plaintiffs’ sexual harassment claims).
53. See Mimi A. Akel, Note, The Good, the Bad, and the Evils of the
#MeToo Movement’s Sexual Harassment Allegations in Today’s Society: A
Cautionary Tale Regarding the Cost of These Claims to the Victims, the
Accused, and Beyond, 49 CAL. W. INT’L. L.J. 103, 107 (2018) (noting that
Tarana Burke used the term “me too” in 2006 to connect survivors of sexual
abuse).
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movement began in 2017.54 On October 5, 2017, numerous
women publicly accused movie producer Harvey Weinstein of
sexual violence or harassment.55 Ten days later, the actress
Alyssa Milano sent the following tweet: “If you’ve ever been
sexually harassed or assaulted write ‘me too’ as a reply to this
tweet.”56 Within weeks, millions of people across the country
utilized the hashtag “#MeToo” to share their own stories of
sexual abuse.57 Although not all of these claims involved
workplace harassment, the range of contexts, locales, and types
of abuse alleged in these stories demonstrated the myriad ways
in which sexual misconduct reinforced gender-based power
dynamics in both work- and non-work settings.58
Throughout the months and years that followed, scores of
individuals publicly brought allegations of misconduct against
prominent men in entertainment, the media, the arts, the
restaurant business, and law, among other industries.59 Many
well-known men in these sectors either quit or were fired,
including Weinstein, Matt Lauer, Charlie Rose, Leslie Moonves,

54. See State Regulation of Sexual Harassment, 20 GEO. J. GENDER & L.
421, 422 (2019) (describing the unprecedented attention that harassment
allegations received during the early days of the #MeToo movement).
55. See Ann C. McGinley, The Masculinity Motivation, 71 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 99, 99–100 (2018) (summarizing the early history of the #MeToo
movement); Tippett, supra note 23, at 230 (same).
56. See Martha Chamallas, Will Tort Law Have Its #Me Too Moment?, 11
J. TORT L. 39, 67 (2018) (discussing the initial history of the #MeToo
movement); Hébert, supra note 6, at 321–22 (examining the evolution of the
#MeToo movement).
57. See State Regulation of Sexual Harassment, supra note 54, at 422–23
(noting that the allegations of sexual misconduct against Weinstein ranged in
severity from off-color comments to rape); The Harvey Weinstein Story: From
Studio to Courtroom in 40 Years, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2020), https://perma.cc
/E5J4-7ZQP (summarizing the timeline of key events from the #MeToo
movement).
58. See Schultz, supra note 3, at 24–25 (discussing the importance of
addressing institutional forms of harassment); Brian Soucek, Queering Sexual
Harassment Law, 128 YALE L.J.F. 67, 69–70 (2018) (explaining how #MeToo
stories revealed underlying gender-based power structures).
59. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 8, at 73–74 (describing the cascade of
accusations that the Weinstein case triggered); Tippett, supra note 23, at
231– 32 (outlining the breadth and depth of #MeToo accusations).
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Mario Batali, Garrison Keillor, and Ninth Circuit Judge Alex
Kozinski.60 At the same time that these high-profile falls from
grace occurred in rapid succession, the larger issue of sexual
harassment shot to the forefront of national news and popular
attention.61 Focusing on the connection between famous #MeToo
stories and larger employment structures, advocates explained
how the problem of sexual harassment persisted even in
ordinary workplaces.62 In the course of exposing these various
iterations of sexual misconduct—both in popular media stories
and in less-publicized settings—the #MeToo movement
highlighted the dispiriting reality that harassment remains far
too common, despite decades of advocacy and legal reforms to
combat the problem.63
1.

Questioning #MeToo’s Fairness and Lasting Impact

As with many social movements, #MeToo has triggered a
backlash, with critics charging that the movement undermines
due process protections for the accused.64 Characterizing
#MeToo as a “naming and shaming” campaign, skeptics argue
that the movement leaves little time for fair investigations.65
According to this critique, statements like “#BelieveWomen”
60. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Of Power and Process: Handling
Harassers in an At-Will World, 128 YALE L.J.F. 85, 85–86 (2018); Chamallas,
supra note 56, at 67–68 (analyzing third-party responsibility for sexual
violence); Kenneth R. Davis, Strong Medicine: Fighting the Sexual
Harassment Pandemic, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1058 (2018) (explaining how the
#MeToo movement highlighted widespread instances of harassment).
61. See Tippett, supra note 23, at 230–34 (outlining the connection
between publicized #MeToo stories and the limitations of antidiscrimination
law).
62. See Murray, supra note 4, at 833–34 (examining #MeToo’s broader
critique of the state’s failure to impose appropriate consequences on sexual
harassers).
63. See Schultz, supra note 3, at 24–25 (highlighting the need for a
theoretical framework to address harassment).
64. See Emily Yoffee, Why the #MeToo Movement Should Be Ready for a
Backlash, POLITICO (Dec. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/F9KH-DQMC (outlining
possible unintended consequences of #MeToo).
65. See Wexler et al., supra note 5, at 51 (summarizing critiques of the
movement).
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only exacerbate the problem by encouraging a rush to
judgment.66
Another line of critique asserts that #MeToo proponents fail
to gauge the relative wrongdoing of various forms of
misconduct.67 For example, within weeks of the Weinstein
allegations, the names of many alleged perpetrators appeared
on a so-called “Shitty Media Men” list.68 The author of the list
invited others to lodge anonymous accusations, which ranged in
severity from “weird lunch dates” and “creepy [direct message]s”
to sexual assault and brutal rape.69 Yet, despite the huge
variation in these allegations, the proposed punishments for
such transgressions usually involved some form of career
destruction or social ostracism.70 Such calls for banishment,
regardless of relative wrongdoing, have prompted cynics to
analogize #MeToo to a “witch hunt” or “sex panic.”71
Even #MeToo backers have questioned the movement’s
long-term ability to bring lasting change to American
workplaces.72 The movement has undoubtedly raised social
awareness about harassment and caused some state

66. See Yoffee, supra note 64 (arguing that the strength of the accusations
against Harvey Weinstein derived partly from corroboration).
67. See Murray, supra note 4, at 867–70 (summarizing the due process
concerns created by crowdsourced registries of alleged harassers).
68. See Masha Gessen, When Does a Watershed Become a Sex Panic, NEW
YORKER (Nov. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/KGW9-V7LM (critiquing the #MeToo
movement for failing to afford due process to the accused and for failing to
differentiate among various acts of alleged misconduct).
69. See Andrew Sullivan, It’s Time to Resist the Excesses of #MeToo, N.Y.
MAG. (Jan. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/9FYQ-668G (calling for greater
distinctions between different types of sexual misconduct).
70. See id. (critiquing #MeToo advocates for the limited range of penalties
that they propose).
71. See Nora Stewart, Note, The Light We Shine into the Grey: A
Restorative #MeToo Solution and an Acknowledgment of Those #MeToo Leaves
in the Dark, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1693, 1703–04 (2019) (discussing charges
that #MeToo has failed to differentiate between various forms of sexual
misconduct).
72. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 3, at 25 (arguing for tangible actions in
the wake of #MeToo); Wexler et al., supra note 5, at 53 (discussing the need to
enact deeper cultural and structural changes following #MeToo).
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legislatures to revisit their antiharassment laws.73 But the most
visible, tangible responses to #MeToo have focused on the
discharges of high-profile men.74 These firings, while often
justified, do not necessarily change the environments that
allowed harassment to flourish.75 Likewise, discharging
harassers one-by-one does not repair the reputational damage
that victims suffered or necessarily disrupt the underlying
institutional conditions that fostered harassment in the first
place.76 In fact, publicly discharging notable men may give the
appearance of effective corporate responses, while actually
reducing public pressure to bring about more robust, structural
reforms.77 Beyond high-profile media firings, another practical
impact of the #MeToo movement has involved the far more
mundane exercise of expanding reporting systems at ordinary
workplaces.78
2.

Expansion of Training and Reporting Schemes in the
Wake of #MeToo

Even though the #MeToo movement has highlighted the
prevalence of sexual harassment, employers have not
fundamentally altered their methods for dealing with this
ongoing problem.79 While some employers have reaffirmed the
73. See RAGHU & SURIANI, supra note 48, at 2–7 (summarizing several
state-based actions and recommendations for combating harassment); JoAnna
Suriani, Note, “Reasonable Care to Prevent and Correct”: Examining the Role
of Training in Workplace Harassment Law, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y
801, 814–15 (2018) (examining mandatory training laws that states have
enacted since 2018).
74. See Murray, supra note 4, at 833–34 (outlining common corporate
responses to revelations of harassment).
75. See Schultz, supra note 3, at 26 (arguing for structural changes that
go beyond merely discharging accused harassers).
76. See id. (discussing the need to take action beyond mass firings in
response to #MeToo).
77. See Wexler et al., supra note 5, at 54 (examining how public firings
can crowd out other antiharassment efforts).
78. See Suriani, supra note 73, at 803 (discussing corporate responses to
#MeToo).
79. See Erin M. Morrissey, Comment, #MeToo Spells Trouble for Them
Too: Sexual Harassment Scandals and the Corporate Board, 93 TUL. L. REV.
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strength of their existing train-and-report mechanisms, others
have expanded these systems following #MeToo.80 For example,
when asked if they had taken any new steps in reaction to the
movement, employers such as Wal-Mart, Target, Sears
Holdings, Subway, Costco, and Aramark simply expressed
commitment to their existing internal systems.81 Other firms
have expanded their employee instructional materials or
reevaluated their reporting methods.82 Reflecting these
developments, the demand for antiharassment trainings has
skyrocketed since the #MeToo movement began.83
Employers have doubled-down on train-and-report systems
at a time when their legal exposure to harassment claims has
increased.84 The United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”)—the federal agency charged with
enforcing Title VII—reported a 50 percent jump in sexual
harassment lawsuits between 2017 and 2018, and most human
resource professionals expect that the #MeToo movement will
trigger a flood of litigation.85

177, 199–200 (2018) (questioning whether #MeToo has brought about
meaningful reforms to American workplaces).
80. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 8, at 63 (examining the effectiveness of
antiharassment trainings); Rebecca Greenfield, Powerful Men Have Changed
Their Behavior at Work Since #MeToo, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2018, 10:54 AM),
https://perma.cc/HSH8-AZN9 (discussing the recent rise of harassment
trainings and complaints).
81. See Kantor, supra note 7 (surveying employer responses to #MeToo).
82. See id. (contrasting #MeToo advocates’ call for greater accountability
with the ineffectiveness of existing legal protections).
83. See Suriani, supra note 73, at 803–04 (noting the increased emphasis
on train-and-report systems following #MeToo).
84. See id. (“The perceived threat of increasing litigation and the
exposing of entrenched toxic workplace culture have caused demand for
anti-harassment trainings to skyrocket as employers seek out training
opportunities for their employees.”).
85. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, WHAT YOU SHOULD
KNOW: EEOC LEADS THE WAY IN PREVENTING WORKPLACE HARASSMENT (2018),
https://perma.cc/F6HT-T5W9 [hereinafter EEOC, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW];
Pamela M. Harper, The Anniversary of #MeToo: A Time of Reckoning for Law
Firms, BUS. L. TODAY (Oct. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/C8S6-GZQE
(summarizing emerging reporting data following #MeToo); Morrissey, supra
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Despite the increased number of harassment charges,
however, when these future plaintiffs try to sue in court, they
will encounter a legal system that regularly dismisses
harassment claims.86 As explained in greater detail below, the
harassment loophole immunizes employers from liability by
taking advantage of in-house reporting schemes in two distinct
ways.87 First, harassment victims who neglect to file internal
complaints typically cannot sue because courts require them to
“take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities”
that their employers offer.88 For the vast majority of harassment
victims, the chance to obtain relief ends at this point because
very few individuals who experience harassment ever utilize
their employers’ reporting systems.89 In addition, plaintiffs who
officially inform their employers of harassing behaviors also lose
in court if their employers “correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior” after a complaint is filed.90 As such, the
harassment loophole allows victims to obtain relief only if
individuals file in-house complaints and their employers fail to
adequately address the problem.91
note 79, at 201–02 (discussing various predictions about #MeToo’s effect on
victim reporting).
86. See Chamallas, supra note 56, at 57–58 (discussing the connection
between the harassment loophole and the high loss rate that harassment
plaintiffs experience in court).
87. See infra Part II.A.
88. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (applying the harassment
loophole to instances of supervisory harassment); see Vance v. Ball State
Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 429–30 (2013) (applying the harassment loophole to
instances of coworker harassment).
89. See RAGHU & SURIANI, supra note 48, at 1 (estimating that 70 percent
of victims fail to report harassment); Porter, supra note 7, at 51–52
(summarizing data on the reporting rates of harassment victims).
90. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
91. See Oppenheimer, supra note 29, at 285 (discussing the fear that
courts will not compensate victims who fail to inform their employers about
harassment); E. Jacob Lindstrom, Note, All Carrots and No Sticks: Moving
Beyond the Misapplication of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 21
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 111, 124–25 (2010) (explaining how many courts have
allowed firms to utilize their reporting systems to completely avoid
harassment liability).
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In light of the safe harbor that this liability rule provides to
firms, it is no coincidence that companies have reacted to
#MeToo by pointing to their robust internal systems.92 This
combination of silence, liability reduction, and harassment can
be seen in several legal opinions that courts have issued in the
wake of #MeToo.93 These cases demonstrate that the movement
has done very little to change the existing legal dynamic that
punishes silent victims and rewards employers that adopt
train-and-report systems.94
B.

Judicial Treatment of Harassment Claims Following
#MeToo

Even after #MeToo, courts still frequently absolve
employers of legal responsibility for workplace harassment.
Take the case of Tristana Hunt.95 A sales associate in the
electronics department of a Wal-Mart store in Crestwood,
Illinois, Hunt worked the overnight shift with her supervisor,
Daniel Watson.96 Prior to working with the plaintiff, Watson
had been accused of grabbing a female subordinate’s arm in a
closed office and refusing to let go until the woman screamed.97
The supervisor received “coaching” from Wal-Mart for the
incident.98
According to the plaintiff, shortly after Watson began
supervising her, Watson told Hunt that “he did not understand
92. See Chamallas, supra note 21, at 1322 (examining how training and
reporting systems tend to insulate most employers from liability); Zev J. Eigen
et al., When Rules Are Made to Be Broken, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 109, 118–19
(2014) (discussing the incentives employers have to implement policies that
are “good enough to meet the minimum standard of reasonableness but not so
good that they encourage prompt reporting of harassment in all cases”).
93. See infra Part I.B.
94. See Suriani, supra note 73, at 803–04 (addressing the increased
demand for antiharassment trainings following #MeToo).
95. Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 931 F.3d 624, 626 (7th Cir. 2019).
96. Id.; Brief and Required Short Appendix of Plaintiff-Appellant,
Tristana Hunt at 5, Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 931 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2019)
(No. 18-3403), 2019 WL 1224347.
97. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 626.
98. Id.

176

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 155 (2021)

how a woman could have breasts so large despite having a small
body.”99 One month later, Watson said to Hunt that “he wanted
to shower with her and feel her breasts.”100 Following that
incident, Hunt took Watson’s phone from her hand and said that
he wanted to find naked pictures of her and “again asked when
he could see her breasts.”101 Recounting these incidents, the
Seventh Circuit commented, “Watson asked to see Hunt’s
breasts several times within a few days.”102 After enduring these
harassing comments, Hunt formally complained to Wal-Mart.103
Given that only Hunt and Watson witnessed the alleged
harassment, however, Wal-Mart could not substantiate Hunt’s
claims.104 Nevertheless, Wal-Mart reminded Watson of its
“zero-tolerance policy” against harassment and required
Watson to attend antiharassment training.105 Hunt reported no
further incidents of harassment after she filed her internal
complaint with Wal-Mart.106
Reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to Hunt and
writing in the post-#MeToo era, the Seventh Circuit
characterized Watson’s multiple requests to see Hunt’s breasts
as “offensive,” “sexually suggestive,” “unprofessional,”
“unacceptable,” and “inappropriate.”107 Despite acknowledging
the “inappropriate” nature of a male supervisor’s multiple
requests to see his subordinate’s breasts, the Seventh Circuit
nevertheless utilized the harassment loophole to absolve
Wal-Mart of responsibility.108 In doing so, the court noted that
“Wal-Mart had a comprehensive policy that explicitly prohibited
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 627.
103. Id. (“Immediately following this formal discipline, Hunt decided to
report Watson’s harassment to the store manager . . . at the end of her shift.”).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 626–28.
108. Id. at 627–28 (“An employer may escape liability if it can show the
hostile work environment was not accompanied by an adverse employment
action and prove an affirmative defense.”).
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sexual harassment” and provided employees with “robust”
reporting opportunities.109 Pointing to Hunt’s delayed reporting,
the Seventh Circuit summarized the timeline as follows:
Watson’s harassment occurred over the course of five months,
and Hunt filed an internal complaint roughly two weeks after
the supervisor made his last request to see her breasts.110
According to the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the
harassment loophole, Hunt waited too long to complain.111 Even
though Hunt explained that she did not immediately go to
Wal-Mart’s human resources department because she feared
retaliation, the court held that “an employee’s subjective fears
of confrontation, unpleasantness or retaliation do not alleviate
the employee’s duty to alert the employer to the allegedly hostile
environment.”112 Utilizing the harassment loophole to dismiss
Hunt’s harassment complaint, the court held that Hunt had
“unreasonably delayed” notifying Wal-Mart of the problem.113
Turning from supervisory harassment to coworker
harassment, the Eleventh Circuit recently issued a
post-#MeToo decision that also utilized the harassment
loophole.114 Nicole Patsalides worked as a law enforcement
officer in Fort Pierce, Florida.115 According to Patsalides, a male
patrol officer inappropriately touched various parts of her body
at least ten times over the course of two weeks.116 On one
occasion, the coworker rubbed his hand down Patsalides’s thigh,
from her service belt to her knee.117 Unlike other harassment
109. Id. at 630.
110. Id. at 626–27.
111. Id. at 631 (“Hunt failed to take advantage of any reporting
mechanisms for four months and thereby prevented Wal-Mart from taking
corrective measures.”).
112. Id. (citation omitted) (crediting Wal-Mart for retraining Watson, even
though the company’s internal investigation did not substantiate the
harassment allegations against him).
113. See id.
114. See Patsalides v. City of Fort Pierce, 724 F. App’x 749, 752 (11th Cir.
2018).
115. Id. at 750.
116. Id. at 751.
117. Id.
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victims, however, Patsalides did not remain silent.118 Instead,
she promptly complained to the police department, and her
employer fired the male officer following an investigation.119
After the discharge, Patsalides’s coworkers allegedly ridiculed
her for “snitching” on a fellow police officer.120
Praising the swiftness of the employer’s response, the
Eleventh Circuit stated that “the [c]ity’s actions following the
complaint were a model of proper employer responsiveness
under Title VII.”121 It would be hard to disagree with this
conclusion, except for the fact that the city had already verified
numerous other incidents of sexual misconduct involving the
same male patrol officer long before he touched Patsalides.122 In
fact, the city had concluded that the officer had committed
sexual misconduct on four separate occasions against various
victims over the course of sixteen years.123 In response to these
other incidents, the city had counseled the officer on proper
behavior, issued written warnings, and suspended the officer
without pay.124 Thus, Patsalides’s complaint of thigh-rubbing
represented at least the fifth accusation against the same male
patrol officer. Commenting on the male officer’s repeated
transgressions, the Eleventh Circuit found that his employer
had engaged in appropriate progressive discipline over sixteen
years and that there was “no basis to hold the [c]ity liable for
the male officer’s actions toward Patsalides.”125
Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Fourth Circuit also issued a
post-#MeToo decision that relied on the harassment loophole to

118. See id. (“After two weeks of this sort of behavior, Patsalides reported
the male officer to a superior in the police department.”).
119. See id. (crediting the employer for responding effectively to
harassment allegations).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 752.
124. See id. (concluding that the employer’s reaction to the harassment
charges was “entirely consistent with the [c]ity’s obligations under Title VII”).
125. Id.
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absolve an employer of liability for coworker harassment.126
Carla Clehm, an ammunition plant employee in western
Virginia, was sexually assaulted twice by her coworker, Joshua
Linkous.127 A subsequent investigation revealed that Linkous
had sexually assaulted at least three other female coworkers
over the course of several years.128 According to the plaintiff,
after Linkous was discharged and imprisoned, several
coworkers sided with Linkous and began to harass Clehm for
revealing the assault.129
Writing its opinion roughly two years after the #MeToo
movement began, and construing the facts in the plaintiff’s
favor, the Fourth Circuit described how viciously Clehm’s
coworkers treated her after she exposed Linkous’s sexual
assaults. The court stated that “Clehm has experienced various
incidents of harassment by co-workers who have grabbed her,
subjected her to sexual and profane comments, berated her for
‘putting a man in prison and taking him away from his
family,’ . . . and objected to working alongside her.”130 But
despite these repeated attacks on Clehm for coming forward, the
Fourth Circuit still utilized the harassment loophole to dismiss
her sexual harassment complaint. According to the court,
“Clehm has not made the showing—required because she was
sexually assaulted and harassed by her co-workers, rather than
supervisors—that [the employer] ‘knew or should have known
about the harassment and failed to take effective action to stop
it.’”131 In light of Clehm’s initial silence about the sexual assault
and her employer’s response thereafter, the Fourth Circuit

126. See Clehm v. BAE Sys. Ordnance Sys., Inc., 786 F. App’x 391, 394
(4th Cir. 2019) (“Clehm has not demonstrated that her co-workers’ retaliatory
harassment is imputable to BAE, nor has Clehm established that BAE
subjected her to any other adverse employment action.”).
127. Id. at 392.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 392–93.
130. Id. at 393.
131. Id. at 393–94 (quoting Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325,
333–34 (4th Cir. 2003)).
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determined that Clehm’s employer was not responsible for the
harassment.132
In each of the foregoing cases, federal appellate courts
issued opinions in the wake of #MeToo that utilized the
harassment loophole to dismiss plaintiffs’ Title VII complaints.
Even though the plaintiffs in these cases almost certainly
alleged sufficient facts to constitute severe and pervasive
harassment—breast
gawking,
thigh
rubbing,
victim
blaming— it was not enough for courts to accept the truth of
these allegations.133 In other words, the call by #MeToo
advocates to “#BelieveWomen” did not matter in court because
the harassment loophole enabled employers to escape liability,
even if courts assumed the truth of the plaintiffs’ allegations.134
The employers in these cases did not necessarily do
anything wrong. Indeed, the courts in each decision specifically
found that the firms responded appropriately once victims
complained. But faced with the choice between forcing
defendants to pay for harassment beyond their control or with
leaving harassment victims uncompensated, each court utilized
the harassment loophole to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Title VII
claims. This outcome remains the rule, not the exception, even
in the wake of #MeToo.135 Indeed, beyond the three federal
appellate decisions discussed here, numerous other federal
courts have relied on the harassment loophole to dismiss sexual
harassment complaints during the months and years following
#MeToo.136 Thus, despite the demand from #MeToo advocates
132. Id.
133. See Kate Webber Nuñez, Toxic Cultures Require A Stronger Cure: The
Lessons of Fox News for Reforming Sexual Harassment Law, 122 PA. ST. L.
REV. 463, 492–93 (2018) (discussing the standards for proving harassment
under Title VII).
134. See Yoffee, supra note 64 (criticizing the call by some #MeToo
proponents to “just believe” accusers).
135. See State Regulation of Sexual Harassment, supra note 54, at 465
(discussing the judicial reluctance to alter the legal framework for analyzing
harassment claims).
136. See, e.g., Cooper v. Smithfield Packing Co., Inc., 724 F. App’x 197, 203
(4th Cir. 2018) (dismissing harassment complaint based on the harassment
loophole); Tucker v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 734 F. App’x 937, 942–43 (5th
Cir. 2017) (same); Ferencin v. Lehigh Univ., No. 18-1469, 2019 WL 7282503,
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for legal systems that compensate victims and hold employers
accountable for workplace wrongs, the harassment loophole
remains firmly in place. To understand why, the following
section examines the origins of the harassment loophole and the
empirical assumptions that the Supreme Court relied upon to
create this safe harbor from employer liability.
II.

DEVELOPING THE HARASSMENT LOOPHOLE

The Supreme Court created the legal rules that govern
sexual harassment long before the #MeToo movement. In 1986,
the Court first declared that federal antidiscrimination law
prohibited sexual harassment.137 A product of focused advocacy
by legal feminists, the decision, Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson,138 was a historic victory for working women who had
endured decades of gender-based mistreatment.139 Yet despite
this extraordinary legal development, the Supreme Court
blunted much of its effect over a decade later when, in 1998, the
Court extended immunity to employers that adopted

at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 2019) (same); Elkins v. Miller County., No. 18-cv-4115,
2019 WL 5399516, at *6 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 22, 2019) (same); Opper v. Fred Beans
Motors of Doylestown, Inc., No. 18-CV-4230, 2019 WL 4242627, at *8 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 6, 2019) (same); Holland v. NTP Marble, Inc., No. 17-cv-2909, 2019 WL
2059966, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 2019) (same); Strozyk v. Phoenixville Hosp.,
357 F. Supp. 3d 485, 493 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (same); Payne v. Great Plains
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 348 F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1204 (N.D. Okla. 2018) (same);
Berger v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 16-cv-06557, 2018 WL 2943963, at *10 (E.D.
Pa. June 13, 2018) (same). But see, e.g., Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, 895
F.3d 303, 313 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding sufficient facts to question the
effectiveness of an employer’s antiharassment policy); Wilson v. New Jersey,
No. 16-7915, 2019 WL 5485395, at *13 (D.N.J. Oct. 25, 2019) (same); Mercado
v. Sugarhouse HSP Gaming, L.P., No. 18-3641, 2019 WL 3318355, at *8 (E.D.
Pa. July 23, 2019) (same); Rorke v. Toyota, 399 F. Supp. 3d 258, 280 (M.D. Pa.
2019) (same); Grooms v. City of Phila., No. 17-2696, 2018 WL 4698856, at *8
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2018) (same).
137. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (holding that “a
claim of ‘hostile environment’ sex discrimination is actionable under Title VII”
(citation omitted)).
138. Id.
139. See Green, supra note 6, at 152–53 (summarizing the general view
that Meritor represented a “victory for workplace equality”).
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train-and-report systems.140 Declining to hold companies
strictly liable for sexual harassment, the Court opted instead for
a notice-based system of liability that protected employers from
most harassment claims.141
This Part evaluates the history of the harassment loophole
considering #MeToo. It explains how the Court embraced
notice-based liability based on two flawed empirical
assumptions that the #MeToo movement has now refuted.142
First, the Court assumed that limiting employer liability would
induce a large share of victims to bring their harassment
allegations to employers.143 Second, the Court assumed that the
loophole would significantly reduce incidents of harassment by
inducing firms to adopt effective train-and-report schemes.144
Unfortunately, decades after the Court first made this empirical
wager, ongoing high levels of harassment undermine the basis
for the Court’s faith in these systems.
A.

Embracing Notice-Based Harassment Liability

The Supreme Court began to form the harassment loophole
when it first recognized sexual harassment as a legal claim. In
140. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806–07 (1998)
(stating that an employer may raise an affirmative defense to a sexual
harassment claim by “provid[ing] a proven, effective mechanism for reporting
and resolving complaints of sexual harassment, available to the employee
without undue risk or expense”); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
742, 765 (1998) (stating that an employer may raise an affirmative defense by
showing that “the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and . . . that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer”).
141. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08 (explaining that an employer may
satisfy its burden under the second element of its defense by “showing an
unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the
employer”); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765–66 (same).
142. See infra notes 191–224 and accompanying text.
143. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806–07 (discussing administrative
incentives to “encourage victims of harassment to come forward” (citation
omitted)).
144. See id. at 807 (anticipating that the harassment loophole would
“encourag[e] forethought by employers”).
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a stunning and now widely celebrated ruling, the Court held in
Meritor that sexual harassment constituted a form of prohibited
sex discrimination under Title VII.145 The decision relied heavily
on Catharine MacKinnon’s foundational book, Sexual
Harassment of Working Women.146 In it, MacKinnon explained
how unwanted sexual attention constituted an additional
condition of work that women had to endure.147 For example, the
first national survey on harassment at the time reported that
92 percent of women described sexual harassment as a problem
and one-third of women believed that their appearance was
among their most important job qualifications.148 According to
MacKinnon, federal antidiscrimination law prohibited
employers from requiring women to work under these
circumstances.149 By barring employers from imposing
sex-based “conditions” of employment, Title VII also prohibited
“sexual harassment,” even though the statute did not explicitly
use the term “harassment.”150

145. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66 (concluding that a sex-based “hostile or
abusive work environment” constitutes a violation of Title VII); see West,
supra note 50 (discussing the historic nature of the Meritor ruling).
146. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN (1979). See also Linda Hirshman, How the Supreme Court
Made Sexual Harassment Cases More Difficult to Win, WASH. POST (June 19,
2019, 6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/ZKV9-DYCB (referencing MacKinnon’s role
in the Meritor case).
147. MACKINNON, supra note 146, at 40–41 (“Unwanted sexual
advances . . . can be a daily part of a woman’s work life” and contribute to “the
woman’s insecurity about her work competence.”).
148. See Kaitlin Menza, You Have to See Redbook’s Shocking 1976 Sexual
Harassment Survey, REDBOOK MAG. (Nov. 28, 2016), https://perma.cc
/ZYG3-5BML (summarizing early survey data on sexual harassment); Ginia
Bellafante, Before #MeToo, There Was Catharine A. MacKinnon and Her Book
‘Sexual Harassment of Working Women’, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://
perma.cc/P3DM-XFXB (discussing the early history of harassment litigation).
149. See MACKINNON, supra note 146, at 208 (stating that when sexual
harassment “has an impact upon fundamental employment decisions and
upon the workplace atmosphere, sexual harassment is discrimination in
employment” prohibited by Title VII).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)(1); see Eigen et al., supra note 92, at 120
(examining the Meritor decision).
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Against this backdrop of commonplace harassment and
generalized sexism, the Meritor decision marked a momentous
shift in the law’s treatment of gender-based discrimination.151
Holding that Title VII prohibited “hostile environment”
harassment,
the
Meritor
Court
stated
that
this
antidiscrimination violation occurred when unwelcome
sex-based mistreatment was sufficiently “severe or pervasive”
so as “to alter the conditions of [the plaintiff’s] employment.”152
Monumental, yet vague, the decision left for other courts the
daunting task of defining terms like “unwelcome” and “severe or
pervasive.”153 Notwithstanding these ambiguities, however, the
decision undoubtedly triggered a tectonic shift in Title VII
jurisprudence.154 In addition to its legal significance, the Meritor
decision also prompted genuine change in norms and behaviors
at many American workplaces by abating some of the most
egregious forms of harassment that were commonplace at the
time.155
Despite
Meritor’s
important
advancement
of
antidiscrimination norms, however, the decision also marked
the initial formulation of the harassment loophole. After
announcing that Title VII prohibited harassment, a majority of
the Justices in Meritor explained that they would treat this type

151. See Noa Ben-Asher, How Is Sex Harassment Discriminatory?, 94
NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 25, 25–26 (2018) (discussing the historic
significance of Meritor).
152. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (citations
omitted); see David Sherwyn et al., Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel
Your “1-800” Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction
of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1271–72 (2001) (discussing Meritor and examining the
legal development of sexual harassment law).
153. See Carrie N. Baker, Sexual Extortion: Criminalizing Quid Pro Quo
Sexual Harassment, 13 LAW & INEQ. 213, 220–21 (1995) (examining the
judicial application of Meritor to different types of harassment claims).
154. See generally West, supra note 50 (characterizing the Meritor decision
as “stunning and much-celebrated”).
155. See Judith Resnik, The Rights of Remedies, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW 247, 252 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds.,
2003) (discussing the impact of Meritor).
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of Title VII violation differently than all others.156 The Meritor
Court acknowledged that under Title VII “courts have
consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory
discharges of employees by supervisory personnel, whether or
not the employer knew, should have known, or approved of the
supervisor’s actions.”157 Rejecting this long line of cases that had
attached strict vicarious liability to all other Title VII violations,
the Meritor Court concluded that agency considerations
required it to treat hostile work environment claims
differently.158 Accordingly, over the objection of a vigorous
dissent, a five-Justice majority in Meritor stated that employers
were “not always automatically liable for sexual harassment by
their supervisors.”159 This conclusion stood in stark contrast to
the D.C. Circuit’s earlier decision in Meritor, which had held
that any rule other than strict liability would “create an
enormous loophole in the statute . . . .”160 Disagreeing with the
D.C. Circuit, the Meritor Court directed lower courts to consider
underlying agency principles when determining the extent of an
employer’s responsibility for supervisory harassment.161
Meritor marked the Supreme Court’s first major
development of the harassment loophole.162 The Court’s
distinction between supervisory harassment and other forms of
harassment confirmed the widely held view that employers
would never pay for non-supervisory harassment unless firms
156. See Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72 (explaining that Congress
intended “to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers
under Title VII are to be held responsible”).
157. Id. at 70–71 (citation omitted).
158. See id. at 72 (explaining that the legislative “decision to define
‘employer’ to include any ‘agent’ of an employer” calls on courts “to look to
agency principles for guidance”).
159. Id.; see Hemel & Lund, supra note 24, at 1601 (discussing the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on harassment and vicarious employer
liability).
160. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing Miller v.
Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979)).
161. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72.
162. See Chamallas, supra note 21, at 1321 (observing that Meritor was
“the first Supreme Court case to address sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination”).
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themselves acted negligently.163 As to supervisors, however,
Meritor’s vague reference to “agency principles” left lower courts
scrambling to determine the extent of a firm’s legal
responsibility for supervisory misconduct.164 Reacting to this
ambiguity, lower courts reached widely divergent conclusions on
the question.165 Judges in these cases could not agree on which
“agency principles” to apply or the circumstances, if any, that
would give rise to strict employer liability for supervisory
misconduct.166
After thirteen years of disagreement among the lower
courts, the Supreme Court returned to the issue of vicarious
liability in two companion decisions. In Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth167 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,168 the
Supreme Court announced a new standard for evaluating an
employer’s obligations to pay for supervisory harassment.
Adhering to its previous directive in Meritor that courts should
not hold companies “automatically liable,” the Faragher and
Ellerth decisions crafted an entirely new affirmative defense
that did not previously exist under Title VII.169 According to the
Court, in cases where plaintiffs experienced supervisory
harassment without suffering tangible employment actions,
employers enjoyed a defense with two necessary elements: “(a)
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and
163. See id. at 1320–21 (noting that the EEOC’s approach prior to Meritor
“imposed strict liability for the actions of supervisors and negligence liability
for all others”).
164. See Hemel & Lund, supra note 24, at 1601–02 (examining the fallout
from Meritor).
165. See Oppenheimer, supra note 29, at 273 (asserting that lower courts
“were in disarray” over the issue of vicarious liability for over a decade
following Meritor).
166. See William R. Corbett, Faragher, Ellerth, and the Federal Law of
Vicarious Liability for Sexual Harassment by Supervisors: Something Lost,
Something Gained, and Something to Guard Against, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 801, 808–09 (1999) (discussing the “diversity of approaches” that lower
courts took on the question of vicarious liability).
167. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
168. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
169. Id. at 807–08 (offering an affirmative defense to employers when no
tangible employment action is taken).

SEXUAL HARASSMENT LOOPHOLE

187

correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”170
Although Faragher and Ellerth said that this new rule
imposed “vicarious liability” on employers,171 the defense was
actually a modified form of negligence liability. A feature of
agency law, vicarious liability holds employers responsible for
employees’ bad acts, even when employers exercise all
reasonable care to prevent misconduct, such as training
employees and enforcing rules against misbehavior.172 In
contrast to the no-fault nature of genuine vicarious liability, the
Faragher-Ellerth defense allowed employers to escape liability
altogether if they could prove that they acted reasonably and
that plaintiffs did not.173 The Court customized this
negligence-based
affirmative
defense
specifically
for
harassment claims, but did not apply it to other Title VII
violations.174 Although Faragher and Ellerth placed the burden
of proving a lack of fault on employers, the decisions
nevertheless announced a fault-based standard through which
employers could avoid legal exposure to harassment claims by

170. Id. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; see Heather S. Murr, The
Continuing Expansive Pressure to Hold Employers Strictly Liable for
Supervisory Sexual Extortion: An Alternative Approach Based on
Reasonableness, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529, 554–55 (2006) (examining the
Court’s development of the harassment loophole).
171. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
172. See Oppenheimer, supra note 27, at 132–33 (criticizing courts for
failing to distinguish between concepts of direct and vicarious liability in the
harassment context).
173. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 177–78 (describing the Faragher
Court’s “special affirmative defense” that allowed an employer to “escape
liability if it proved both that it had acted reasonably in taking steps to prevent
and correct harassment and that the plaintiff had acted unreasonably in
failing to use the employer’s internal grievance procedure”).
174. See id. at 178 (describing the Faragher-Ellerth defense as a “strange
animal” that was rooted in the Court’s desire to effectuate Title VII policies).
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focusing on the reasonableness of their responses to victim
complaints.175
Fifteen years after Faragher and Ellerth, the Supreme
Court completed the harassment loophole in a decision that
shifted the judicial focus away from supervisory harassment to
coworker harassment. In Vance v. Ball State University,176 the
Court narrowly defined the meaning of “supervisor” for
purposes of harassment litigation.177 The Vance Court
acknowledged that Meritor, Faragher, and Ellerth endorsed
distinctions between supervisors and non-supervisors.178
Whereas the Faragher-Ellerth defense required employers to
prove a lack of negligence for supervisory harassment, the rule
for coworker harassment required plaintiffs to affirmatively
establish their employer’s negligence.179 Centering its decision
on this distinction, the Vance court defined supervisors as
employees who possess the power to “take tangible employment
actions against the victim.”180 Under this test, the Vance Court
suggested that ordinary managers should be treated as
“coworkers” if they controlled the day-to-day activities of
subordinates without possessing the power to fire or discipline
them.181 Applying the “coworker” label to a broader range of
employees, the Vance Court effectively expanded the
harassment loophole by requiring more plaintiffs to directly
prove their employers’ negligence in handling harassment
complaints.182
175. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 766–77 (explaining how
the Faragher-Ellerth defense focused on employer fault).
176. 570 U.S. 421 (2013).
177. See id. at 424 (“An employee is a ‘supervisor’ for purposes of vicarious
liability under Title VII if he or she is empowered by the employer to take
tangible employment actions against the victim.”).
178. See id. (summarizing different liability rules based on the harasser’s
identity).
179. See id. at 427–28 (stating that liability for coworker harassment
requires a showing of employer negligence).
180. Id. at 450.
181. See id. at 434–35 (“[T]he law often contemplates that the ability to
supervise includes the ability to take tangible employment actions.”).
182. Id. at 429–30.
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Put together, the four major Supreme Court decisions that
created the harassment loophole—Meritor, Ellerth, Faragher,
and Vance—all exhibited a remarkable faith in train-and-report
systems. Whether a plaintiff alleged coworker harassment (thus
requiring proof of employer negligence) or supervisory
harassment (thus enabling employers to eliminate liability by
proving a lack of negligence), the Supreme Court repeatedly
anchored the harassment loophole in its belief that internal
reporting systems would effectively prevent and correct
harassment.183
For example, the Meritor decision referred positively to
employer “procedure[s] specifically designed to resolve sexual
harassment claims.”184 Although Meritor did not specifically
demarcate the legal effect that these procedures would have on
harassment claims, the Court fully endorsed train-and-report
systems in Faragher and Ellerth.185 Both decisions predicted
that internal schemes would encourage “forethought by
employers and saving action by objecting employees.”186 In
essence, the Justices in these cases assumed that by limiting
employer liability, the Court would encourage victims to come
forward and employers to thwart harassment.187
More recently, the Vance Court emphasized the importance
of train-and-report systems in combating coworker
harassment.188 Anticipating criticism that its decision would
183. See Schultz et al., supra note 47, at 42 (arguing that under Faragher
and Ellerth, “victims of hostile work environment harassment . . . must first
report the harassment to the employer through its internal complaint process
or else risk losing later in court”).
184. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 71 (1986) (citations
omitted).
185. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 (1998)
(explaining that employers will “have greater opportunity and incentive to
screen” supervisors, “train them, and monitor their performance”).
186. Id. at 807; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
187. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 786–87 (questioning the
Supreme Court’s empirical assumptions in Faragher and Ellerth).
188. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 449 (2013) (stating that
negligence liability for coworker harassment would not “‘relieve[] scores of
employers of responsibility’ for the behavior of workers they employ”(citations
omitted)).
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expose workers to managerial harassment, the Vance Court
wrote:
A plaintiff could still prevail by showing that his or her
employer was negligent in failing to prevent harassment
from taking place. Evidence that an employer did not
monitor the workplace, failed to respond to complaints, failed
to provide a system for registering complaints, or effectively
discouraged complaints from being filed would be
relevant.189

Thus, just as the Court spoke to the power of internal reporting
schemes to address supervisory harassment in Faragher and
Ellerth, the Vance Court approved of these same systems to
combat coworker harassment.190 This prediction of harassment
prevention—embedded in each holding—assumed that the
harassment loophole would prompt victims to come forward and
share their harassment stories with employers.
B.

Contesting the Loophole: Enduring Harassment Despite
Internal Reporting Systems

Over thirty years have passed since the Supreme Court first
recognized sexual harassment as a Title VII violation.191 Over
twenty years have passed since the Court defined the contours
of the harassment loophole by assuming that train-and-report
systems would curb sexual harassment.192 Since that time,
employers have offered their workers numerous trainings,
handbooks, and other mechanisms to address workplace sexual
misconduct.193 As noted above, #MeToo has only intensified this
trend, with employers expanding their internal antiharassment
189. Id. at 448–49.
190. See id. (asserting that a negligence-based liability standard for
coworker harassment still holds employers responsible for monitoring
workplace interactions).
191. See Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.
192. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765–66.
193. See Zakaria, supra note 5 (“[T]he incentive behind creating an
anti-sexual-harassment policy, having trainings, and even instituting an
in-house reporting mechanism, became . . . more about evading liability by
meeting the criteria of the ‘affirmative defense . . . .’”).
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schemes in response to the movement.194 Yet today, after
decades of experience with train-and-report systems, the
#MeToo movement has shown how harassers often operate with
impunity even at workplaces with robust internal reporting
systems.195 The fact that harassment endures despite decades of
training suggests that today’s renewed corporate calls for more
reporting schemes will reduce employer liability, without
necessarily reducing harassment itself.
1.

High Rates of Harassment in the Wake of #MeToo

Even though the Supreme Court predicted that the
harassment loophole would combat harassment by incentivizing
victim reporting and employer policing, evidence from the
#MeToo movement has challenged these assumptions. The “too”
of “#MeToo” not only signaled a shared solidarity among
victims, it also emphasized the ongoing commonness of
harassment.196 Emerging statistics from #MeToo point to the
breadth of the problem. For example, between 2017 and 2018,
the EEOC reported a 13 percent increase in sexual harassment
charges and a 23 percent increase in the agency’s finding of
reasonable cause to believe accusers who filed claims.197
Although the uptick in sexual harassment filings provides
tangible evidence that #MeToo has raised awareness about the
problem, it is difficult to estimate the precise rate of sexual
harassment at worksites.198 For instance, the EEOC’s
comprehensive study on the subject concluded that anywhere
from 25 percent to 85 percent of women “report having

194. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing corporate reaction to the #MeToo
movement).
195. See West, supra note 50 (contrasting the historic nature of the Meritor
decision with the modern workplace realities that #MeToo has revealed).
196. See Soucek, supra note 58, at 72 (characterizing #MeToo as “a
movement built on repetition”).
197. See EEOC, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW, supra note 85 (summarizing
reporting and enforcement statistics).
198. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 8, at 70 (discussing unreported incidents
of harassment).
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experienced sexual harassment in the workplace.”199 The agency
attributes this wide range in estimates to differences in survey
methodologies.200 But despite the variance in these numbers,
nearly all estimates indicate that harassment remains a
widespread problem and that harassers often work at
companies with well-developed train-and-report systems.201
Of course, today’s high rate of harassment does not
necessarily mean that training and reporting have failed
altogether. It is possible that the problem of sexual harassment
would be worse if such systems were not in place. But there is
virtually no social science data to support this proposition.202
For example, the EEOC recently reviewed a number of studies
on sexual harassment trainings and found insufficient evidence
to substantiate the use of these systems standing alone.203
Similarly, other studies have also failed to show a demonstrable
decline in sexual harassment, even as more employers have
adopted antiharassment policies.204 Given the lack of empirical
justification for these schemes, it is quite remarkable that
harassment liability and a multibillion-dollar training industry
all hinge on the presumption that train-and-report systems
effectively prevent harassment.205 In addition, the reluctance of
victims to come forward has cast doubt on the Supreme Court’s

199. See CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, EEOC, SELECT TASK
FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE (June 2016), https://
perma.cc/67XA-K3EJ (offering recommendations to stop and prevent
workplace harassment).
200. See id. (explaining that reporting results depend on whether
researchers use convenience samples or probability samples).
201. See Zakaria, supra note 5 (questioning the effectiveness of
antiharassment systems).
202. See Schultz et al., supra note 47, at 42–43 (stating that the lack of
evidence in support of reporting schemes is “unsurprising”).
203. See FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 199 (discussing the limitations of
harassment training, standing alone); Bisom-Rapp, supra note 8, at 63–64
(reporting on the significance of the EEOC’s findings).
204. See Nuñez, supra note 133, at 487–88 (summarizing analyses on the
effectiveness of internal reporting systems).
205. See Krieger, supra note 36, at 174–75 (critiquing the harassment
loophole for ignoring studies on victim behavior).
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prediction that the harassment loophole would trigger
widespread reporting.206
2.

Ongoing Victim Silence and Retaliation

In addition to exposing the continuing reality of harassment
in American workplaces, the #MeToo movement also has helped
explain why victims endure workplace harassment rather than
utilize their employers’ internal systems. Common victim
responses to harassment include downplaying the gravity of the
situation, enduring the behavior, or avoiding the harasser.207 In
fact, studies on this issue indicate that filing an internal report
remains the least likely response of harassment victims.208
Thus, even though the Supreme Court crafted the harassment
loophole with the hope that encouraging internal reporting
would lead to meaningful change, the reality is that victims
rarely seek any kind of formal, organizational relief.209
As a threshold matter, it is unclear why the Supreme Court
ever assumed that limiting liability would influence victim
behavior in this way. After all, most workers have never heard
of the harassment loophole, so they are unlikely to know that
they must first utilize their employers’ reporting systems to
preserve their harassment claims in court.210 Beyond simply not
knowing about the legal consequences of failing to report,
however, there are many other compelling reasons why

206. See Schultz et al., supra note 47, at 42–43 (“[R]equiring victims to
report sexual harassment through internal complaint processes discourages
them from challenging harassment at all.”).
207. See FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 199 (reporting that roughly
three-quarters of individuals who experience harassment never talk to a
supervisor, manager, or union representative about the harassment).
208. See Grossman, supra note 22, at 23 (summarizing studies on the
responses of harassment victims); Krieger, supra note 36, at 181–82 (“By far,
across a variety of studies spanning a number of years and a range of
occupations, the least frequent response to sexualized workplace conduct
involves . . . bringing a formal complaint against the harasser.”).
209. See Krieger, supra note 36, at 182–83 (examining reporting rates of
harassment victims).
210. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 787–88 (criticizing the
Supreme Court’s assumptions about victim-reporting incentives).
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harassment victims do not come forward. Research increasingly
shows that training systems can generate backlash, without
necessarily combating gender-based mistreatment at work.211
In the worst case scenarios, internal reporting schemes can
actually facilitate misconduct.212 Take, for instance, many
prominent #MeToo stories in which complaint procedures and
confidential settlement agreements helped conceal problems,
while enabling high-level harassers to keep their jobs.213
Likewise, the results of internal investigations often
characterize disputes as “personal conflicts” between
individuals, while absolving employers of responsibility for any
broader systemic shortcomings.214 Beyond failing to
substantiate victims’ claims, internal investigations can turn
the tables on victims and lead to punishment.215 Studies on the
issue show that victims who report misconduct frequently
experience retaliation, both in overt ways such as discharge and
in more subtle forms such as receiving negative performance
evaluations.216
Given these dynamics, it is unsurprising that victims rarely
come forward to officially report harassment. Today, an
estimated 87 to 94 percent of individuals who experience
harassment never file formal complaints.217 Because the

211. See Green, supra note 6, at 166–67 (discussing the risk of focusing
exclusively on train-and-report systems in response to the #MeToo
movement).
212. See Beiner, supra note 12, at 117 (asserting that the harassment
loophole, “rather than tending to eliminate harassment in the workplace,
tend[s] to let it flourish”).
213. See Tippett, supra note 23, at 243–44 (examining how the #MeToo
movement has highlighted the failure of certain internal complaint procedures
to sufficiently curb harassment).
214. See Green, supra note 6, at 166–67 (noting that internal
investigations may result in firings that fail to lead to broader reforms within
the organization).
215. See Hébert, supra note 6, at 322–23 (asserting that filing an internal
report often results in retaliation against the complaining party).
216. See Mizrahi, supra note 41, at 125–26 (summarizing studies on
retaliation against harassment victims who complain).
217. See FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 199, at 16; see also RAGHU &
SURIANI, supra note 48, at 1 (examining the relationship between charge
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harassment loophole requires employers to address only
reported instances of misconduct, notice-based liability
automatically relieves firms of legal responsibility in the vast
majority of cases.
For the small percentage of harassment victims who
actually utilize their employers’ formal systems, courts still
absolve firms of liability if employers resolve disputes after
victims complain.218 The Supreme Court never intended for
courts to apply the harassment loophole so broadly. The
Faragher-Ellerth defense described “two necessary elements”
that required employers to prove both that they exercised due
care and that the victim unreasonably failed to complain.219
According to a straightforward application of this test, courts
should hold employers automatically liable for all verified
complaints about supervisory harassment because, under such
circumstances, employers cannot satisfy the second element of
the defense that requires proof of employee silence.220 Likewise,
a true application of the first element would lead courts to
scrutinize the effectiveness of an employer’s policy to determine
whether a firm’s internal system actually prevented
harassment. In practice, however, courts frequently decline to
adhere to these mandates.221 Instead, judges often accept a
company’s antiharassment policy on paper or decline to punish
employers that respond to complaints, even though defendants
in such circumstances cannot prove that victims unreasonably

statistics and the reporting rates of individuals who experience harassment);
Porter, supra note 7, at 51–52 (summarizing recent data on victim reporting).
218. See Eigen et al., supra note 92, at 133–34 (explaining how courts
absolve “well-behaved employers” of liability even when victims reasonably
report harassment).
219. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998)
(detailing the two elements that compromise the affirmative defense); see also
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Murr, supra note
170, at 554–55 (examining the Court’s development of the Faragher-Ellerth
defense).
220. See MARSHALL, supra note 19, at 48 (asserting that many courts have
misapplied the Faragher-Ellerth defense).
221. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 152, at 1296–1301 (discussing cases in
which judges avoided a stringent application of the affirmative defense).
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stayed silent.222 The net result of this dynamic is that employers
can adopt cosmetic policies that prohibit harassment, without
taking more meaningful actions to deter it.223
In sum, the Supreme Court developed the harassment
loophole by making numerous empirical suppositions that the
#MeToo movement has undercut. By requiring employees to
process their harassment complaints through a firm’s internal
system, the Court tried to incentivize cooperative behavior
between victims and employers. Pointing to the enduring nature
of harassment, however, #MeToo has demonstrated that many
employers technically adhere to the letter of the Court’s
mandate, while still tolerating high levels of harassment at
their worksites.224 In light of these outcomes, a new rule of
liability should increase employers’ incentives for actually
curbing workplace harassment, thereby advancing one of the
Court’s primary goals when it first created the harassment
loophole.
III. STRICT EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR HARASSMENT
Employers should pay for all forms of employee
harassment, regardless of company fault. Given the harassment
loophole’s failure to effectively curtail harassment, businesses
should not escape liability simply by enacting train-and-report
systems. At first glance, such a shift in liability rules—from the
status quo of limited employer responsibility to a requirement
of strict liability—might seem unfair to employers that
reasonably attempt to prevent and correct misconduct.225 For
222. See id. at 1266–67 (explaining how the affirmative defense may create
incentives for employers to “exercise just enough reasonable care to satisfy a
court, but not enough to make it easy or comfortable for employees to complain
of workplace harassment”).
223. See Oppenheimer, supra note 27, at 133 (critiquing judicial decisions
that absolve employers of vicarious responsibility for supervisory
harassment).
224. See Grossman, supra note 22, at 70–71 (explaining how parties have
responded to the incentives created by the harassment loophole).
225. See Ben-Asher, supra note 151, at 27 (discussing how a rule of
automatic liability would hold “perfectly vigilant” employers liable for
harassment).
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instance, ever since the Supreme Court created the harassment
loophole, firms have publicized “zero tolerance” policies,
provided victims with reporting opportunities, and punished
harassers in response to complaints.226 Although many of these
efforts constitute forms of cosmetic compliance,227 even when
firms make genuine attempts to correct misconduct, this Part
explains why they should still pay for harassment.
A rule of strict employer liability would better comport with
the goals and doctrinal underpinnings of agency law and Title
VII. When the Supreme Court announced the core components
of the harassment loophole in 1998, it based much of its opinion
on a specific provision of agency law that was abandoned eight
years later when the Restatement of Agency was updated.228 In
addition, many courts that apply agency rules require
employers to pay for intentional employee misconduct, even
when firms have done nothing wrong and even when employees
violate explicit work prohibitions.229
Just as the law of agency has changed since the Supreme
Court created the harassment loophole, so too have social
judgments about a firm’s responsibility to prevent harassment.
When the Court created the loophole, it acknowledged that
social attitudes about an employer’s responsibility for employee
transgressions might evolve. As an example, the Faragher
Court cited the shift in views about employees who smoke: “We
simply understand smoking differently now and have revised
the old judgments about what ought to be done about it.”230
226. See MARSHALL, supra note 19, at 47 (describing a “feeding frenzy
among human resources professionals” to offer employers antiharassment
policies and procedures).
227. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 8, at 74 (criticizing the standalone use of
antiharassment training and policies).
228. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759–61 (1998).
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (AM. L. INST. 1957)
(articulating the “aided in accomplishing” standard), with RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2006) (explaining the reasons
why the American Law Institute later rejected the “aided in accomplishing”
standard).
229. See Oppenheimer, supra note 29, at 272 (examining the no-fault
nature of vicarious employer liability).
230. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 797 (1998).
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Analogizing this example to harassment, the Court recognized
that agency law could theoretically characterize harassment “as
one of the costs of doing business.”231 Although the Court
declined to hold employers responsible for harassment in 1998,
the force behind the #MeToo movement demonstrates that
society has “revised the old judgments about what ought to be
done about it.”232
A shift to strict employer liability would not only reflect
changes in agency law and on-the-ground realities, it would also
harmonize harassment jurisprudence with the rest of Title VII.
Courts hold employers strictly liable for all Title VII violations,
except for harassment.233 For example, employers must pay for
discriminatory hirings, firings, promotions, and demotions,
even when firms have trained employees not to discriminate,
enacted antidiscrimination rules, and taken reasonable steps to
prevent these unlawful acts.234 Companies remain liable in
these circumstances not because they bear any direct blame for
the discrimination but because automatic liability ensures that
victims will receive compensation, while providing greater
incentives for firms to enact genuine prophylactic measures.235
These goals of compensation and deterrence—rooted in both
Title VII and agency law—are best served when courts require
employers to pay for predictable employee misconduct, even
when firms try to prevent these bad acts. Just as blameless
employers must pay for discriminatory discharges, so too should
firms pay for the far-reaching forms of employee harassment
that #MeToo has revealed.

231. Id. at 798.
232. Id. at 797.
233. See Grover, supra note 9, at 810–11 (outlining Title VII’s vicarious
liability distinctions).
234. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 761–62 (contrasting the
vicarious liability rules of tort law with the vicarious liability rules of
harassment law).
235. See Beiner, supra note 12, at 144 (examining the legal and
policy-based justifications for a rule of strict employer liability for harassment
claims).
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The Supreme Court, Title VII, and Agency Law

A product of agency law, “vicarious liability” requires
defendants to pay for the wrongful acts of others.236 In the
employment context, the most common form of vicarious
liability is known as “respondeat superior,” which holds
employers liable for torts that employees commit in the scope of
their employment.237 As a vicarious form of responsibility,
respondeat superior does not depend on employer fault.238 Thus,
businesses often must pay for employee misconduct even when
employers properly supervise workers, issue warnings, and
enact rules against misconduct.239
When the Supreme Court announced the core components
of the harassment loophole in Faragher and Ellerth, it turned to
the Restatement (Second) of Agency—written in 1957—for
guidance.240 The Ellerth Court analogized sexual harassment to
an intentional tort and observed that under limited
circumstances agency law holds masters responsible for their
servants’ intentional torts.241 For example, employers must pay
for harms caused by employees who engage in intentional
misconduct “to serve the employer.”242 Applying this principle to
Title VII, the Ellerth Court found that the “serve the employer”
test did not apply to harassment claims because sexual
harassers rarely act to promote the interests of their firms.243

236. See Sykes, supra note 11, at 563 (defining the boundaries of vicarious
employer liability).
237. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 136–37 (outlining the components
of respondeat superior liability).
238. See Oppenheimer, supra note 29, at 274 (examining rationales for
holding employers vicariously responsible for the tortious behavior of
employees).
239. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 136–37 (explaining how courts have
narrowly construed vicarious liability in sexual abuse cases).
240. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 755 (1998) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (AM. L. INST. 1957)).
241. Id. at 756 (citing F. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 394
(4th ed. 1952)).
242. Id. at 756–59.
243. Id. at 756–57.
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Instead, the Ellerth Court found that harassers act on “personal
motives” or “sexual urges.”244
But the Faragher opinion—issued on the same day as
Ellerth—acknowledged that courts do not always use the “serve
the employer” test to make vicarious liability determinations.245
In fact, the Faragher Court recognized a broad split in agency
law on the question of a firm’s vicarious responsibility for
intentional employee misconduct. For example, the opinion
highlighted a string of cases that extended employer liability to
“intentional torts that were in no sense inspired by any purpose
to serve the employer.”246 To illustrate this point, the Court cited
a famous Second Circuit opinion that attached vicarious liability
to the Coast Guard for a drunken sailor’s intentional flooding of
a drydock.247 Even though the sailor acted without any
motivation to serve his employer, the Second Circuit held that
the Coast Guard should nevertheless pay for the resulting
damages because “a business enterprise cannot justly disclaim
responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be
characteristic of its activities.”248
Declining to reconcile these apparently conflicting agency
decisions, the Faragher Court observed that, at its core, agency
law reflected societal views about the costs that employers
should fairly bear for employee transgressions.249 The Court
stated that expanding these costs to new activities depended on
whether “the servant’s acts should be considered as one of the
normal risks to be borne by the business in which the servant is
employed.”250 Applying the standard to sexual harassment, the

244. Id. at 756–59.
245. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 795–96 (1998)
(listing other tests courts have used to resolve vicarious liability cases).
246. Id. at 794.
247. See id. at 795 (citing Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United States, 398 F.2d
167 (2d Cir. 1968)).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 796.
250. Id. at 797 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (AM.
L. INST. 1957)).
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Faragher Court determined that society did not yet characterize
supervisory harassment as such a cost.251
Critically, both the Faragher and Ellerth opinions left open
the possibility that shifts in agency law could eventually expand
the limits of an employer’s vicarious responsibility for
harassment.252 The Ellerth Court noted that the vicarious
liability rule that it relied upon was “a developing feature of
agency law.”253 Likewise, although it declined to adopt a rule of
strict liability for supervisory harassment, the Faragher Court
recognized that courts could characterize this type of
harassment “as one of the costs of doing business” and that
“developments like this occur from time to time in the law of
agency.”254 As the next section demonstrates, agency law has
evolved since the Court decided Faragher and Ellerth, with
courts increasingly holding employers responsible for various
forms of intentional employee misconduct. This “developing
feature of agency law” should extend to sexual harassment as
well.255
B.

Broadening Vicarious Liability Based on Agency
Developments

The Supreme Court anchored the harassment loophole in a
provision of agency law that no longer exists. Both the Faragher
and Ellerth Courts cited extensively to the Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d), which asked whether a servant
was “aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation.”256 Relying on this provision, the Faragher
Court held that supervisors were most clearly aided by their
supervisory relationship when they took adverse job actions
against subordinates.257 Conversely, the Court held that if
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

See id. at 798.
See infra notes 268–270 and accompanying text.
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763 (1998).
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 798.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 763.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (AM. L. INST. 1957).
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802 (1998) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (AM. L. INST. 1957)).
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supervisors took no such action, then companies could escape
liability through train-and-report systems.258
But as the Faragher Court predicted, this standard of
agency law has evolved since the Court created the harassment
loophole.259 Eight years after the Faragher Court made the
“aided in accomplishing” test the centerpiece of the harassment
loophole, the American Law Institute (ALI) abandoned the
standard altogether.260 According to the ALI, the original
drafters of the Second Restatement likely intended the “aided in
accomplishing” language to apply only to instances of apparent
authority.261 If true, such a change in the meaning of “aided in
accomplishing” would dramatically affect harassment
jurisprudence. If limited only to circumstances in which
supervisors have apparent authority to harass, then the “aided
in accomplishing” test would rarely apply to Title VII cases.
Apparent authority exists when plaintiffs reasonably believe
that agents possess authority to engage in certain acts.262 Given
the prevalence of antiharassment policies in contemporary
workplaces, plaintiffs today would seldom possess any sort of
reasonable belief that their employers authorized their
supervisors to harass them.
The Restatement of Employment Law recently confirmed
this shift in modern agency law.263 The Restatement explained
that the “aided in accomplishing” test should not apply to
employment settings because “[a]lmost all torts in the
employment relationship are ‘aided’ by the existence of that
258. See id. at 808.
259. See infra notes 260–265 and accompanying text.
260. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.08 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2006)
(“This Restatement does not include ‘aided in accomplishing’ as a distinct basis
for an employer’s . . . vicarious liability.”).
261. See id. (“The purposes likely intended to be met by the ‘aided in
accomplishing’ basis are satisfied by a more fully elaborated treatment of
apparent authority . . . .”).
262. See Brian C. Baldrate, Note, Agency Law and the Supreme Court’s
Compromise on “Hostile Environment” Sexual Harassment in Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 31 CONN. L.
REV. 1149, 1158–59 (1999) (explaining why the apparent authority doctrine
does not apply to most hostile work environment claims).
263. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.03 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2015).
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relationship.”264 Given the apparent boundlessness of the “aided
in accomplishing” standard and the fact that the Restatement
of Agency discarded the test, the Restatement of Employment
Law now directs courts to ask simply whether workers commit
torts within the scope of their employment.265
Many courts today still hold that intentional torts occur
outside the scope of employment.266 But even the Faragher
Court recognized the sharp division in agency law on this
question.267 Competing with the traditional approach that
declines to apply vicarious liability to intentional employee
offenses, many contemporary agency decisions hold employers
responsible for intentional employee wrongdoing.268 Courts offer
varying rationales for this shift, but many simply utilize a
broader definition of “scope of employment” and hold that firms
must pay even for their employees’ intentional acts.269
Consider a hypothetical example of strict employer liability
for intentional employee wrongdoing: A fast food restaurant
instructs its employee to mop the floor before the end of her
shift.270 The restaurant trained the employee on safe mopping
techniques, directed her to warn customers about wet floors,
and punished employees who broke these rules. If the employee
uses too much water or otherwise mops negligently, nearly all
courts would require her employer to compensate customers for
their injuries.271 But assume that a customer is injured not
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Sykes, supra note 11, at 589–90 (examining the split of authority on
the question of vicarious employer liability for intentional torts).
267. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 794 (highlighting the different approaches
to vicarious liability taken by the Second Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit).
268. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 760–61 (discussing a trend
among certain courts to expand vicarious employer liability); Sykes, supra
note 11, at 589 (summarizing cases that have taken a “more flexible approach”
to vicarious liability).
269. Verkerke, supra note 10, at 311–12 (“The present trend is toward
more expansive interpretations of the scope of employment.”).
270. See id. at 292–94 (providing a similar example to explain the
relationship between intentional torts and vicarious liability).
271. See Krieger, supra note 36, at 196–97 (examining respondeat superior
liability for intentional misconduct).
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because of the employee’s negligence, but because she
intentionally strikes a customer. For instance, imagine that a
customer makes a snarky remark after the mopper’s warning.
In response, the employee hits the impolite customer over the
head with her mop.272 In many jurisdictions, the restaurant
would still have to pay for the assault even though the assault
certainly did not serve the employer’s interests.273 Courts
applying strict vicarious liability under such circumstances
would note that the assault occurred on company time, on
company property, and while the employee performed job duties
(i.e., mopping and warning).274 Although employees certainly
are not hired to harm third parties, agency law frequently
requires firms to pay for such damages anyway.
In the Title VII context, courts consistently hold employers
strictly liable for discriminatory acts other than harassment,
despite the fact that such intentional employee misconduct does
not advance the firm’s interests.275 For example, if a supervisor
engages in race-based hiring or a religious-based firing, the fact
that a company has instituted policies that prohibit this illegal
behavior does not immunize the firm from liability.276 The
discriminating employee acts within the scope of employment,
even though these acts do not serve the employer’s interests, but
actually harm them.277 Antidiscrimination law holds firms
vicariously responsible in these circumstances when
supervisors mingle authorized conduct (i.e., their hire-fire

272. See Verkerke, supra note 10, at 293 (comparing intentional torts to
employment discrimination).
273. See id. (discussing examples in which vicarious employer liability
applies even when workers do not advance employers’ interests).
274. See Oppenheimer, supra note 29, at 274 (examining the basis for
holding employers automatically liable for intentional employee misconduct).
275. See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding
an employer strictly liable for racial discrimination).
276. See Carrillo, supra note 15, at 54 n.73 (discussing an employer’s
responsibility for supervisory harassment).
277. See Oppenheimer, supra note 27, at 91 (examining contemporary
justifications for respondeat superior liability).
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power) with prohibited conduct (i.e., discrimination).278 Under
this view, it is not the discriminatory act that serves the
employer’s purpose, but instead the work duty that accompanies
the bad act.279 As long as the supervisor performs work functions
that serve the employer’s interests, the employer is liable even
if the supervisor performs those functions in a discriminatory
manner.
Applying the foregoing principles to harassment, the test
for employer liability should consider the relationship between
a wrongdoer’s job-related acts and the wrong itself.280 Under
this framework, the question is not whether a firm specifically
hired an individual to harass employees.281 Instead, the
question is whether the harasser engaged in harassing
behaviors while simultaneously performing job duties.282 The
Restatement of Employment Law refers to “unratified acts
committed within, or incident to, work that the employer
assigned . . . .”283 The same query applies to sexual harassment.
Courts should conclude that harassment falls within the scope
of employment when a harasser entwines his job performance
with harassing acts. Consider, for example, a supervisor who
emails an agenda for an upcoming company meeting to his
female coworker. The male employee has specific job
responsibilities that include drafting the agenda, sending the
email, and attending the meeting itself. In the course of
performing these job duties, the male employee also emails dirty
jokes, makes sexual propositions, or physically grabs the female
coworker during the company meeting. Each of these actions
278. See id. at 78 (outlining various rationales for holding masters
vicariously liable for their servants’ wrongful acts).
279. See id. at 86 (discussing scenarios in which “sexual harassment is
incidental to the performance of the job”).
280. See id. at 71 (examining rationales for finding that harassment occurs
within the scope of employment).
281. See id. at 82 (“[E]mployers typically do not employ supervisors to
sexually harass employees.”).
282. See id. at 85–86 (asserting that a vicarious liability analysis should
ask whether a supervisor “mixes work-related and non-work-related
functions”).
283. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.03 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2015).
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mixes the supervisor’s authorized functions with harassing
behavior.284
Beyond examining the connection between job duties and
committed wrongs, many courts also hold firms vicariously
responsible for employee misconduct when the employment
relationship increases the risk of harm or if the harm is a
predictable hazard of work.285 Some courts have adopted this
alternative approach to vicarious liability by asking whether “in
the context of the employer’s particular enterprise, the
employee’s conduct is not so unusual or startling that it seems
unfair to include the loss resulting from it in the employer’s
business costs.”286 According to this view, questions of vicarious
liability should focus on the broad issues of risk-creation and
foreseeability.287 The more that an endeavor enhances certain
risks, the more likely that the firm should pay for the
foreseeable costs generated by those risks.288 As the
Restatement of Employment Law says, “[b]ecause the employer
generally benefits from the employee’s actions taken within the
scope of employment, the employer should bear the costs that
the actions wrongly impose on third parties.”289
Companies pay damages in these circumstances not
because they can always prevent misconduct, but because
society expects firms that reap economic benefits from their
activities to assume responsibility for the predictable costs of
those activities.290 The firm does not assume responsibility for
284. See Verkerke, supra note 10, at 298 (examining different ways that
an employee’s bad act could nevertheless advance an employer’s interests).
285. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 144–46 (discussing foreseeability
and “enterprise” risk theories of vicarious liability).
286. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2006)
(acknowledging that some courts utilize this alternative formulation of
vicarious liability but criticizing the standard’s breadth).
287. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 144–46 (examining the relationship
between vicarious liability, foreseeability, and the creation of risk).
288. See id. at 157–58 (contrasting enterprise risk theory with the more
“antiquated” standard that bases vicarious employer liability on the
tortfeasor’s motives).
289. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.03 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2015).
290. See Krieger, supra note 36, at 196–97 (considering the normative
rationales for vicarious employer liability).
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all theoretical costs, but only for foreseeable categories of harm
that courts can fairly attribute to the workplace.291 Applied to
sexual harassment claims, the #MeToo movement has drawn
critical public attention to rampant levels of harassment across
many industries.292 Considering this reality, courts can fairly
characterize sexual harassment as a category of harm that
typically arises out of workplace dynamics and work-specific
settings.293 Supervisors and coworkers frequently harass one
another in company spaces (e.g., offices, cubicles, break rooms,
etc.) using company venues (e.g., interviews, meetings, email
servers, etc.) on company time (e.g., during business hours, work
trips, etc.). Although employers may not always foresee specific
incidents of harassment and may take reasonable steps to
prevent harassment, the prevalence and work-specific setting of
harassing acts enable employers to predict these harms and,
accordingly, justify requiring firms to compensate victims when
they occur.
C.

Extending Liability to Coworker Harassment

Most discussions of vicarious employer liability have
focused exclusively on supervisory harassment. Indeed, the
Supreme Court’s core decisions that formulated the harassment
loophole—Meritor, Faragher, and Ellerth—all involved sexual
harassment by supervisors.294 Only the most recent addition to

291. See Verkerke, supra note 10, at 301 (discussing the concepts of
foreseeability and enterprise causation in relation to vicarious liability).
292. See supra Part I.A.
293. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 140 (“[P]ower dynamics and
structural features of the workplace . . . facilitate sexual abuse . . . .”).
294. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998) (stating
that two of Faragher’s supervisors allegedly subjected Faragher and other
females to unwanted touching and lewd remarks); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 747 (1998) (“During [Ellerth’s] employment, she alleges,
she was subjected to constant sexual harassment by her supervisor.”); Meritor
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 59–60 (1986) (summarizing Vinson’s
allegations that she was continually subjected to sexual harassment by the
vice president).
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the
canon—Vance—involved
coworker
harassment.295
Mirroring the disproportionate attention that courts have paid
to supervisory harassment, legal scholarship on the issue has
concentrated on the misconduct of supervisors, as opposed to
coworkers.296 This lack of attention paid to coworker
harassment is understandable given the widely held
presumption that only supervisors who fire or take other
tangible actions against workers can expose companies to
vicarious liability.297
Despite the dearth of analysis on this issue, however,
closing the harassment loophole should include holding
businesses liable for all forms of employee harassment, whether
committed by supervisors or coworkers. The doctrinal
underpinnings of Title VII and agency law support this broader
approach to vicarious liability.298 Courts presently apply a
negligence standard when analyzing employer responsibility for
coworker harassment.299 According to this liability test, firms
become liable for coworker harassment only if employers knew
or should have known about the harassment and acted
unreasonably in response.300 This standard, of course, is a form

295. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424–25 (2013) (explaining
that a fellow employee continually harassed Vance despite University efforts
to address the situation).
296. See, e.g., Carrillo, supra note 15, at 53–54; Grossman, supra note 30,
at 735–36 (proposing a rule of strict employer liability for supervisory
harassment); Phillips, supra note 26, at 1268–69 (same). But see Fisk &
Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 788–89 (discussing coworker harassment and
vicarious liability); Oppenheimer, supra note 27, at 107–08 (same).
297. See Katherine S. Anderson, Note, Employer Liability Under Title VII
for Sexual Harassment After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 1258, 1261–62 (1987) (noting that courts have never held firms
vicariously liable for coworker harassment).
298. See, e.g., Oppenheimer, supra note 27, at 107–08 (“Limiting vicarious
liability to incidents of supervisorial harassment is an improper application of
the law of agency.”).
299. See Grossman, supra note 30, at 689–90 (discussing the difference
between direct and vicarious liability).
300. See Corbett, supra note 166, at 811–12 (summarizing the standard of
liability for coworker harassment).
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of direct liability, not vicarious liability.301 The firm becomes
liable through its own unreasonable response to harassment, as
opposed to becoming automatically liable for coworker conduct,
regardless of company fault.302
If a broader approach to agency law places supervisory
harassment within the scope of employment, then the same
rationale logically applies to coworker harassment as well.303
Nothing in agency law limits vicarious liability only to official
supervisory acts. After all, in the tort context, courts regularly
hold companies responsible for the misconduct of their
nonsupervisory personnel. For example, the waiter who
intentionally pours coffee on a customer can trigger automatic
liability for his employer, regardless of his nonsupervisory
status and regardless of the employer’s response.304 The same is
true if a school janitor attacks a member of the public.305 The
janitor’s lack of supervisory functions would have little bearing
on the school’s responsibility to pay for damages that the janitor
causes.306 Many courts would apply vicarious liability in these
circumstances
because
agency
law
covers
all
employees—supervisors, high-level managers, and ordinary
employees—who commit torts within the scope of their
employment.307

301. See Sykes, supra note 11, at 578 (asserting that a liability standard
based on an employer’s negligence “is not really vicarious at all”).
302. See id. at 577 (noting that a true form of “strict” liability prohibits
employers from defending against actions based on the reasonableness of their
responses).
303. See Oppenheimer, supra note 27, at 108 (outlining situations in which
employers should pay for employees’ intentional misconduct).
304. See Oppenheimer, supra note 29, at 274 (explaining that many courts
hold employers vicariously liable for intentional employee torts).
305. See Verkerke, supra note 10, at 292–93 (using the hypothetical
example of a violent employee to illustrate certain rules of vicarious liability).
306. See id. at 293–94 (discussing employer liability for intentional torts
of employees).
307. See Phillips, supra note 26, at 1244–46 (examining the application of
agency law to different categories of workers); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF AGENCY § 7.07 (AM. L. INST. 2006) (defining employer-employee
relationships).
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The Supreme Court has already stated that if supervisory
harassment falls within the scope of employment, then coworker
harassment should as well. For example, the Faragher Court
explicitly found that the “rationale for placing harassment
within the scope of supervisory authority . . . would apply when
the behavior was that of coemployees.”308 Likewise, the Ellerth
Court observed that a broad view of vicarious liability would
extend to coworkers because the employment relationship
provides coworkers with “[p]roximity,” “regular contact” and “a
captive pool of potential victims.”309 Of course, the Faragher and
Ellerth opinions concluded that harassing behavior—whether
committed by supervisors or coworkers—generally did not fall
within the scope of employment.310 But as explained above,
changes in agency law and in societal perceptions of harassment
have altered this calculus.
Like supervisors who harass subordinates while exercising
their hire-fire authority, coworkers frequently interweave job
duties with gender-based harassment.311 Harassers often
behave opportunistically, and the workplace can help facilitate
this misconduct.312 Coworkers operate in the same physical
space, collaborate with fellow employees, and share repeated
encounters.313 As the entity that benefits from these
interactions, employers should pay for the harassment-related
costs that arise from them, even if the firm has acted reasonably
to prevent misconduct.314 Coworkers are as much a part of the
productive process as supervisors.315 Whereas, the Supreme
308. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 800 (1998).
309. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760 (1998).
310. See supra notes 166–170 and accompanying text.
311. See Oppenheimer, supra note 27, at 107–08 (examining the
relationship between harassment, job performance, and agency law).
312. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 159 (discussing certain reasons why
harassment is “job-related”).
313. See Jane E. Larson, Sexual Labor, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW 129, 132 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds.,
2003) (discussing repeat interactions between workers).
314. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 186 (outlining the relationship
between vicarious liability and risk-creation).
315. See Verkerke, supra note 10, at 304–05 (examining how rationales
based on causation and foreseeability support a broad application of vicarious
liability).
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Court determined in 1998 that harassment falls outside the
scope of employment, the #MeToo movement has shown how
harassers today regularly fuse harassing behaviors with normal
job activities. The predictability and frequency of harassment
mean that this form of misbehavior often falls within the scope
of employment for supervisors and coworkers alike. Just as
firms must pay for harms when supervisors perform job
functions
in
a
discriminatory
way—regardless
of
company-specific preventative measures—firms should also
absorb the costs that coworkers generate when they perform job
functions in a harassing manner.
D.

Achieving Agency and Antidiscrimination Goals

Adopting the proposal outlined here would not only
represent a doctrinally sound application of agency law and
Title VII, it would also serve the underlying goals of both bodies
of law. In the tort context, vicarious liability incentivizes
deterrence measures, helps compensate victims, and shifts
losses from plaintiffs to employers and the public.316 Similarly,
Title VII’s objectives include providing redress to victims and
inducing employers to root out discriminatory actions at their
worksites.317 Just as vicarious liability spreads losses among
stakeholders and prompts group investment in underlying
problems, Title VII characterizes discrimination as a societal
harm that damages the public at large.318
In contrast to the harassment loophole, a rule of strict
employer liability can effectively promote these objectives. For
example, an employer’s deterrence incentives would
316. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 786 (comparing the core
goals of Title VII and vicarious liability in tort law).
317. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 850 (2001)
(discussing Title VII’s remedial scheme and purpose); Mark S. Brodin, The
Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy
Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 317–18 (1982) (examining Title VII’s
objectives).
318. See David J. Willbrand, Better Late Than Never? The Function and
Role of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 64
U. CIN. L. REV. 617, 622 (1996) (explaining how Title VII helps serve broad
public policy objectives).
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dramatically change if firms always had to pay for employee
harassment. As noted above, the Supreme Court premised much
of the harassment loophole on the empirical bet that limiting
employer liability would prompt firms to prevent harassment.319
In reality, though, the harassment loophole has provided
employers with the perverse incentive to ignore harassment
until it officially comes to their attention.320 Given that
companies currently have no reason to investigate workplace
harassment until victims officially object, the loophole
encourages firms to make it quite difficult for victims to file
complaints, even while publicly taking a “zero tolerance” stance
against harassment.321 In fact, the loophole provides
litigation-conscious employers with an incentive to draft
minimally-compliant harassment policies that functionally
discourage employees from actually using them.322
In contrast to the status quo, a system that forced
employers to absorb the costs of harassment would induce firms
to take more meaningful steps to prevent harassment.323
Attaching liability to a predefined set of harms provides
businesses with incentives to prevent those harms.324 Thus, if
employers had to pay for harassment, regardless of whether
victims complained, rational firms would attempt to minimize
their legal exposure to this category of harm by discovering

319. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (stating
that the primary objective of Title VII is “not to provide redress but to avoid
harm” (citation omitted)).
320. See Carrillo, supra note 15, at 85–86 (arguing that strict employer
liability would encourage employers to “take the strongest possible affirmative
measure to prevent the hiring and retention of sexist supervisors”).
321. See Grace S. Ho, Not Quite Rights: How the Unwelcomeness Element
in Sexual Harassment Law Undermines Title VII’s Transformative Potential,
20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 131, 142–43 (2008) (discussing the ramifications of
notice-based harassment liability).
322. See id. (examining the incentives created by the harassment
loophole).
323. See Verkerke, supra note 10, at 307–08 (outlining the relationship
between enterprise liability and employer incentives).
324. See id. at 308 (examining the effect of enhanced liability on deterrence
goals).
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systems that actually reduce harassment.325 Although the
particular actions that employers might take would vary
between workplaces, strict liability would, at a minimum,
prompt firms to find out whether their employees are actually
harassing one another—an action that today’s notice-based
approach to liability discourages.326 Beyond taking steps to
detect real-world incidents of harassment, strict liability would
also encourage employers to investigate underlying causes of
harassment at individual worksites such as sex-stratification,
organizational culture, and opportunity structures for abuse
within the company.327 Given that these causes and their
associated remedies will inevitably vary by location, automatic
liability would motivate firms to develop site-specific diagnoses
and plans of action.328 Companies would be encouraged to take
these steps to reduce liability, while recognizing that no system
can stop all incidents of harassment.
Closing the harassment loophole would not only advance
Title VII’s deterrence goal, it would also serve the statute’s
make-whole purpose. Compensating victims and deterring
wrongdoing are central objectives of Title VII.329 For example,
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which expanded
antidiscrimination remedies, emphasized the importance of

325. See Sykes, supra note 11, at 569 (explaining that harassment
prevention depends in part on whether employers have practical measures for
detecting instances of misconduct).
326. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 787–88 (asserting that
under current liability rules employers “need not worry” about workplace
harassment as long as it does not involve job decisions with economic
consequences).
327. See Grossman, supra note 22, at 35–39 (discussing studies on the
effectiveness of harassment prevention); Nuñez, supra note 133, at 502–03
(highlighting the need for systemic solutions to harassment).
328. See Grossman, supra note 22, at 71–72 (“Such an approach will
induce employers . . . to adapt standard measures to idiosyncratic problems
they may face.”).
329. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358
(1995) (discussing the importance of prevention and compensation within Title
VII’s remedial scheme); Grossman, supra note 30, at 720–21 (criticizing the
Supreme Court for emphasizing deterrence over compensation when it created
the harassment loophole).
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victim compensation within Title VII’s statutory framework.330
Even critics of the proposal outlined here would acknowledge
that automatic liability would provide more opportunities to
compensate plaintiffs.331 Under the current system of
notice-based liability, victims of harassment rarely receive
compensation because most of them never formally process their
complaints through their employer’s internal reporting
systems.332 Because the harassment loophole typically
eliminates liability in these circumstances, silent victims must
simply bear harassment costs alone. Even individuals who file
credible allegations with firms mostly receive nothing if
employers end the harassment.333 Under these circumstances,
employers must compensate victims only in the unusual event
that individuals formally complain and firms fail to respond
appropriately.
Extending strict employer liability to coworker harassment
would dramatically advance Title VII’s compensatory objectives
in a way that merely limiting vicarious liability to supervisory
harassment would not. Contrary to the archetypal image of
sexual harassment contained in prominent #MeToo stories,
most victims are harassed by coworkers, rather than by
high-level managers.334 Thus, if vicarious liability applied only
to supervisory harassment, Title VII still would not redress
most injuries. As such, to serve the statute’s make-whole goal, a
revised rule of liability should encompass coworker harassment
as well.
A new approach to liability that shifted the costs of
harassment from victims to firms would emphasize the shared
harms that antidiscrimination violations cause.335 Both Title
330. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; see also Harper, supra note 34, at 58–59
(outlining Title VII’s twin aims of prevention and remediation).
331. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 150–51 (examining the rationales
for vicarious liability).
332. See supra Part II.B.2.
333. See id.
334. See Schultz, supra note 47, at 19 (summarizing data on harassment
as measured by the harasser’s supervisory or non-supervisory status).
335. See Oppenheimer, supra note 27, at 94 (explaining how increasing
employer liability distributes the costs of harassment).
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VII and the #MeToo movement have stressed the need for
collective investment in the problem of workplace
harassment.336 For example, Title VII underscores the
community goal of nondiscrimination and the societal losses
that defendants generate when they violate the statue.337
Likewise, the #MeToo movement has helped explain how sexual
harassment causes collective injuries and not merely private
harms.338 At its core, the movement has framed sexual
misconduct as a community problem that individual victims
should not have to solve alone.339
In contrast to the status quo, in which individual victims
mostly pay the price of harassment, a rule of expanded liability
would recognize the superior ability of firms to absorb and
spread these losses as a cost of doing business.340 Although this
rule would hold employers responsible even for unpreventable
harassment, firms already absorb similar costs in other
antidiscrimination contexts. For example, employers must pay
for discriminatory discharges, even when victims do not report
the illegal behavior and even when employers have tried to
prevent these wrongful acts.341 Faced with a choice between
leaving victims uncompensated or forcing firms to pay for
discrimination, courts have identified employers as the superior
336. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998)
(discussing Title VII’s preventative aims); Tippett, supra note 23, at 252
(asserting that #MeToo represents “a collective cause” that may “serve to
mobilize others”).
337. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974)
(discussing Title VII’s shared project of discrimination eradication); see also
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented
Workers, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1361, 1409 (2009) (discussing Title VII’s “collective
goal of combating unlawful employment practices”).
338. See Hill, supra note 32 (examining certain cultural misperceptions
that the #MeToo movement has highlighted).
339. See Resnik, supra note 155, at 249 (critiquing the notion that
harassment relates only to individual exchanges).
340. See Oppenheimer, supra note 29, at 276 (examining different
justifications for expanding employer liability for harassment).
341. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70–71 (1986) (“[T]he
courts have consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory
discharges of employees by supervisory personnel, whether or not the
employer knew, should have known, or approved of the supervisor’s actions.”).
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cost-bearers in such scenarios.342 The same rationale applies to
an employer’s responsibility to compensate individuals who
experience workplace harassment. The law should impose these
costs on the entity that can manage risks and spread losses, as
opposed to imposing those costs on individual victims.343 This
shift in liability rules would promote Title VII’s preventative
and remedial goals, while recognizing the community’s stake in
combating sexual harassment.
IV. OBJECTIONS TO EXPANDED EMPLOYER LIABILITY
Critics could raise several objections to the current
proposal. For example, strict employer liability might actually
harm employees without reducing harassment. If the law held
employers automatically responsible for harassment, some
firms might over-monitor their workers, while others might
reduce their compliance efforts given that liability would apply
automatically no matter what they did.344 On the other hand,
victims might not report instances of harassment to
management because employer liability would not depend on
notice.345 These dynamics could in turn disproportionately harm
female workers because managers and male coworkers might
limit their interactions with women to avoid harassment
accusations.346 In addition, a rule of strict employer liability
could prompt firms to arbitrarily fire accused harassers based

342. See Beiner, supra note 12, at 144–45 (addressing potential objections
to a rule of strict employer liability for harassment).
343. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 157 (outlining the efficiency and
fairness rationales for vicarious liability).
344. See Stacey Dansky, Note, Eliminating Strict Employer Liability in
Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment Cases, 76 TEX. L. REV. 435, 456–57 (1997)
(“Subjecting employers to strict liability when they have clearly attempted to
eradicate workplace harassment and taken remedial measures once notified
of specific instances of supervisor harassment may deter them from even
attempting to prevent or remedy the harassment.”).
345. See id. (explaining that strict liability may encourage women to stay
silent or not report harassment).
346. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 60, at 88 (discussing fears of
“ill-founded accusations of harassment” among certain workers).
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on unsubstantiated charges.347 And even if the current proposal
somehow avoided these problems, an expansion of employer
liability would not necessarily curb harassment due to other
structural deficiencies of federal antidiscrimination law.348 This
section addresses these concerns and explains why, despite the
facial appeal of each objection, strict liability represents a far
more effective legal rule for combating harassment than the
existing system of notice-based liability.
A.

Ineffectiveness, Cosmetic Compliance, and Excessive
Workplace Monitoring

Strict employer liability could potentially lead to
heightened workplace monitoring without necessarily reducing
harassment.349 Twenty years ago, legal feminists engaged in a
sustained critique of the sanitizing effect that harassment law
had on workplace culture.350 Led by writers such as Vick Shultz
and Janet Halley, these scholars explained how the legal test
for sexual harassment policed sexual norms at work, while
masking underlying forms of exploitation.351 Contrary to the
popular view that harassing incidents always involved a
347. Id.
348. See Hemel & Lund, supra note 24, at 1603–04 (describing Title VII’s
practical limitations).
349. See Dansky, supra note 344, at 464 (“[A] strict liability standard may
incite employers to make irrational and inefficient decisions to increase
monitoring of the workplace beyond a point at which it is cost-justified.”).
350. See Kathryn Abrams, Subordination and Agency in Sexual
Harassment Law, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 111, 111
(Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2003) (examining early
definitions of harassment); Arnow-Richman, supra note 60, at 88–89
(summarizing criticisms of standard sexual harassment accounts).
351. See Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LAW 183, 197–98 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel
eds., 2003); Mary Anne Case, A Few Words in Favor of Cultivating an Incest
Taboo in the Workplace, 33 VT. L. REV. 551, 552–53 (2009) (discussing feminist
scholarship on the effects of harassment law); Vicki Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1686 (1998)
(describing how the current regulation of workplace harassment fails to
address many of the most debilitating forms of sex-based mistreatment); Vicki
Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2064 (2003) (critiquing
the promotion of “workplace asexuality”).

218

78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 155 (2021)

male-female, sexual dynamic, Schultz argued that harassment
affected all genders, took sexual and nonsexual forms, and
involved the assertion of power rather than desire.352 In
addition, Halley explained how employer antiharassment
policies that focused exclusively on sex could disproportionately
target sexual minorities and punish even innocuous or
consensual sexualized behavior.353 In light of these dynamics, a
firm’s compliance regime might potentially rid the workplace of
references to sex, but allow other forms of gender-based
harassment to take place.354 In other words, the law of sexual
harassment could “sanitize” the workplace without necessarily
combating many instances of harassment.355
At first glance, it might appear that a rule of strict liability
would only make matters worse by transforming the sanitized
workplace into an “ultra-sanitized” workplace. After all, if the
current system of notice-based liability already prompts
employers to root out all forms of sexual expression, then a rule
of automatic liability might incentivize even more invasive
interventions.356 Although understandable, this fear mistakes
the current system of cosmetic compliance with the more

352. See Mizrahi, supra note 41, at 121–22 (examining the relationship
between Schultz’s critique and contemporary workplace developments);
Schultz, supra note 351, at 1686–87 (“Yet much of the gender-based hostility
and abuse that women (and some men) endure at work is neither driven by
the desire for sexual relations nor even sexual in content.”).
353. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 60, at 88–89; Schultz, supra note 3,
at 60 (outlining the unintended consequences of defining harassment in sexual
terms); Halley, supra note 351, at 197–98 (discussing harassment regulation
and queer theory); West, supra note 50 (summarizing Halley’s contention that
sexual harassment law stigmatizes sexual expression).
354. See Schultz, supra note 3, at 33–34 ([“T]argeting only sexual
misconduct without addressing related patterns of sexism and deeper
institutional dynamics has serious shortcomings—shortcomings that risk
undermining the broader quest for gender equality.”); Soucek, supra note 58,
at 73–74 (discussing non-sexual forms of gender-based harassment).
355. See Schultz, supra note 3, at 24 (emphasizing the ongoing importance
of identifying different iterations of gender-based harassment).
356. See Krieger, supra note 36, at 196 (summarizing concerns about
antiharassment policies and sexual privacy).
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meaningful prophylactic measures that a rule of strict liability
would prompt employers to take.357
Currently, employers highlight their attention to
sexualized behaviors as a way to signal to employees, courts,
and the public that they are serious about stopping sexual
harassment.358 In reality, however, the current system of
notice-based liability discourages employers from going beyond
cosmetic compliance and genuinely scrutinizing their worksites
for less obvious signs of gender-based mistreatment.359 In
contrast to the harassment loophole, which requires victims to
detect and report harassment themselves, strict employer
liability would prompt employers to proactively assess the
liability risks associated with existing workplace cultures.360
For example, firms might survey their workforce to determine if
employees are experiencing severe gender-based forms of
mistreatment such as social ostracism, sabotage, segregation, or
personal mockery.361 Although workplace monitoring would still
occur under a rule of strict liability, the forms and goals of this
observation would be quite different from those that occur under
the current rule of notice-based liability. In contrast to the
existing system that causes many employers to conduct myopic,
superficial audits of sexualized behaviors, a rule of strict
liability would prompt companies to look more comprehensively
at the systems and interactions that give rise to gender-based
abuse. Because courts would hold them strictly accountable,
firms would scrutinize their worksites to find meaningful ways

357. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 8, at 69–70 (explaining how training
programs can amount to “nothing more than symbolic or cosmetic gestures”).
358. See Tippett, supra note 23, at 244 (discussing the reasons why firms
enact antiharassment systems).
359. See Carrillo, supra note 15, at 84–85 (explaining how notice-based
liability disincentivizes bona fide harassment investigations).
360. See Lawton, Bad Apple Theory, supra note 21, at 867–68 (considering
the practical effects of a shift away from notice-based liability).
361. See Schultz, supra note 3, at 33–34 (2018); Soucek, supra note 58, at
73–74 (explaining how gender-based harassment frequently takes
non-sexualized forms).
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to reduce harassment, rather than to engage in performative
acts of compliance.362
Beyond monitoring workers, expanded liability would
induce employers to examine larger workplace structures that
incubate harassing behaviors. For example, employers might
identify certain organizational practices that often correlate
with harassment such as sex segregation and pay disparities.363
The point of these interventions would not be to eliminate
sexuality from the workplace but to identify underlying systems
that foster harassment and, accordingly, increase a firm’s
exposure to strict Title VII liability. When certain companies
today punish minor sexualized behavior, they engage in
symbolic acts of compliance.364 Because a rule of strict employer
liability would no longer reward these performative acts,
expanded liability would induce firms to adopt systems that
actually prevent harassment to avoid the risk of mounting Title
VII costs.
Finally, under the proposal outlined here, firms would still
retain incentives to detect and correct ongoing harassment at
worksites. Even though employers could not escape liability for
proven instances of past harassment, they could still reduce the
damages that they owe by effectively responding to complaints.
The Supreme Court has already ruled that employers’ good faith
efforts to comply with Title VII prevent plaintiffs from
recovering punitive damages.365 In addition, an employer that
effectively responds to reports of harassing behavior would
362. Cf. Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum, supra note 21, at
210–13 (explaining that federal courts often fail to consider whether an
employer’s superficial compliance actually resulted in a reduction in
harassment at work).
363. Green, supra note 6, at 166–67 (examining employer solutions to
harassment that go beyond training and complaint processes).
364. See Nuñez, supra note 133, at 488 (explaining how some
“organizations engage in ‘symbolic compliance’ that leaves in place the
practices that promote and maintain discrimination”).
365. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545–46 (1999)
(asserting that punitive damages are not warranted under Title VII when
employers make good faith efforts to stop harassment); see also Nuñez, supra
note 133, at 477 (discussing the relationship between punitive damages and
the harassment loophole).
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significantly diminish its exposure to compensatory and other
damages by ending the harassment.366 But in contrast to the
current state of affairs, in which a firm’s effective response to
complaints absolves it of responsibility for even past damages,
a rule of strict employer liability would allow firms to curtail
prospective losses only. This opportunity to avoid responsibility
for future harm would provide employers with incentives to
stamp out harassment, even though such actions would have no
effect on a firm’s obligation to pay for injuries that have already
occurred.
The effect that strict liability would have on victim
reporting is less clear. Theoretically, victims could sit on their
harassment claims, decline to inform management of
harassment, and still sue. Therefore, it might seem like a rule
of strict employer liability would undermine the goal of
“encourag[ing] victims of harassment to come forward” that the
Supreme Court articulated when it created the harassment
loophole.367 But there are several legal and practical reasons
why employees would still retain an incentive to informally
resolve harassment complaints.368 First, as discussed above, the
existing system of notice-based liability has not prompted
widespread reporting because victims credibly fear that their
employers will disbelieve their claims or retaliate against
them.369 Thus, it is not clear how a shift in liability rules would
undermine an already-broken reporting model. Second, many
victims currently fail to report because they worry about losing
their jobs.370 These individuals simply want the harassment to
stop, but they view reporting as an ineffective method for
achieving this end.371 In contrast, if strict employer liability
366. See Carrillo, supra note 15, at 90–91 (outlining employer incentives
for reducing harassment-related damages).
367. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998).
368. See Carrillo, supra note 15, at 90–91 (describing incentives for
employers to address harassment).
369. See supra Part II.B.2.
370. See Harper, supra note 34, at 78 (discussing the reasons why
harassment victims do not utilize internal reporting systems).
371. See Porter, supra note 7, at 60 (explaining the need for proportionality
in employers’ responses to harassment).
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prompted firms to operationalize fair and proportionate
reporting systems, victims would be more willing to come
forward.
At a very practical level, even if victims wanted to withhold
their harassment reports from employers, Title VII does not
afford them much time to do so. The statute of limitations for
initiating Title VII proceedings is only 180 to 300 days,
depending on the jurisdiction.372 Once individuals come forward,
nothing in federal antidiscrimination law prevents employers
from investigating the allegations and enacting appropriate
remedial measures to limit future damages.373 The key
difference between this proposal and the status quo, however, is
that employers could not escape liability through summary
judgment even if plaintiffs failed to file internal complaints.374
As such, a jury or other fact finder could assess damages based
on all harassment-related evidence.375 Such an outcome would
allow plaintiffs to avoid dismissal and tell their stories to a
broader legal audience—a central goal of #MeToo.376 Thus, in
contrast to the current state of affairs, closing the harassment
loophole would increase the incentives for employees to report
misconduct and for employers to redress bona fide instances of
harassment.
B.

Due Process for the Accused

Heightened employer liability could conceivably prompt
businesses to fire accused harassers without offering them fair
investigations. After all, if firms already engage in unfair or
shoddy probes with notice-based liability in place, strict

372. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.
373. See Carrillo, supra note 15, at 90–91 (indicating that employers can
reduce potential exposure through remedial actions).
374. See State Regulation of Sexual Harassment, supra note 54, at 465
(explaining why Title VII plaintiffs often fail to prevail in court).
375. See Lindstrom, supra note 91, at 132–33 (discussing the
liability-damages distinction in harassment litigation).
376. See supra Part I.
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employer liability could potentially worsen the situation.377 But
this critique wrongly conflates the performative nature of
today’s investigations with more effective systems that the
current proposal would encourage. The harassment loophole
currently provides employers with several perverse incentives.
First, as a system of notice-based liability, the loophole
encourages employers to ignore harassment until it officially
comes to the company’s attention.378 But once victims step
forward, separate incentives materialize. To prove publicly that
the firm is committed to antiharassment values, the
harassment loophole motivates employers to summarily dismiss
accused harassers without necessarily conducting fair
investigations.379 The burden of this dynamic falls
disproportionately on lower-status employees who the firm
views as fungible.380 Faced with an official complaint, firms
often balance the costs of liability against the perceived benefits
that the alleged harasser provides to the employer.381 For
lower-status workers, even benign sexualized statements can
give rise to arbitrary disciplinary actions, as compared to the
more extreme behaviors of certain high-level managers whom
the company may nevertheless retain.382
A rule of strict employer liability would fundamentally alter
an employer’s incentives to indiscriminately punish alleged
perpetrators.383 In contrast to the safe harbor provided by the
377. See Tippett, supra note 23, at 275 (examining the argument that
#MeToo fails to afford due process rights to accused harassers).
378. See Willbrand, supra note 318, at 622 (explaining how the sexual
harassment loophole encourages some employers to ignore harassment).
379. See Schultz et al., supra note 47, at 35–36 (underscoring the
importance of contextualizing various forms of sexual expression).
380. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 60, at 91–92 (examining the effect
that different workplace power dynamics have on employers’ responses to
harassment allegations).
381. See Hébert, supra note 6, at 324–25 (outlining the “rare instances in
which the targets of sexual harassment challenge the harassment by legal
action”).
382. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 60, at 90–91 (discussing punishment
and workplace hierarchy).
383. See Porter, supra note 7, at 60–61 (outlining an employer’s
motivations for arbitrarily dismissing accused harassers).
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harassment loophole, the system proposed here would hold
firms automatically liable for past harassment, regardless of
notice and regardless of any remedial actions that the firm
might take in response to complaints.384 Although putting a stop
to harassing behaviors would limit future damages, firms could
only achieve this end by first confirming the identities of actual
harassers and determining what they did. As such, under the
liability regime proposed here, employers would be less
motivated to discipline or fire alleged perpetrators until a
thorough investigation verified what happened. Even then,
strict liability would be more likely to prompt measured
responses from employers, given that the harassment loophole
would no longer exist to reward firms for summarily firing
harassers. Although a company might conclude that the
perpetrator’s actions warrant discharge, it might also find that
less-severe responses could safeguard against future bad acts.
In other words, without the benefit of the harassment loophole
and the incentive for immediate discharge that it creates,
employers would be more likely to take care in ascertaining
what actually occurred and how to solve the problem.
C.

Marginalization of Women

Opponents of expanded liability might fear that such a
move could harm women’s workplace advancement.385 For
example, the proposal might prompt male coworkers to avoid
contact with women to fend off accusations of harassment.386
Male supervisors in particular might refrain from mentoring
women for fear that they could face harassment allegations.387
Indeed, surveys taken in the wake of #MeToo suggest that a
substantial proportion of male managers are reluctant to
384. See supra Part III.
385. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 8, at 69–70 (examining employee
backlash to harassment training); Green, supra note 6, at 166–67 (same).
386. See Kim Elsesser, The Latest Consequence of #MeToo: Not Hiring
Women, FORBES (Sept. 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/7UQX-5WJE (summarizing
concerns related to sex segregation and the fallout from #MeToo).
387. See Grossman, supra note 22, at 48–49 (discussing the “unwanted
effects” of harassment training).
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interact with female subordinates.388 For example, one
post-#MeToo survey reported that a large share of male senior
managers said that they would hesitate to hold one-on-one
meetings with junior women or conduct work travel with
them.389 If a high number of managers acted on these impulses,
this exclusion could significantly hamper employment
opportunities for women. After all, a worker’s progress at many
firms depends on mentorship and social interactions with
management.390 If they were denied these informal modes of
networking, victims might have difficulty proving that these
exclusionary acts happened, given that this type of
discrimination often occurs off the record or without an official
act.391
Despite these genuine fears of ostracism and professional
exclusion, however, such conduct already runs afoul of existing
legal prohibitions. Sex-segregation is illegal under Title VII.392
If male supervisors meet with men behind closed doors but
refuse to meet with women, employers face automatic liability
for these discriminatory acts.393 To the extent that less obvious
forms of exclusion go undetected, these unremedied outcomes
388. See Working Relationships in the #MeToo Era, LEAN IN (2019), https://
perma.cc/3P7M-3G8F (“60% of managers who are men are uncomfortable
participating in . . . common work activit[ies] with a woman, such as
mentoring, working alone, or socializing together. That’s a 32% jump from a
year ago.”); see also Nikki Graf, Sexual Harassment at Work in the Era of
#MeToo, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/CHJ5-9BE6
(reporting survey data on the public’s perception of #MeToo’s workplace
impacts).
389. See Working Relationships in the #MeToo Era, supra note 388; see
also Julie C. Ramirez, Is #MeToo Harming Women’s Careers, HUMAN RES.
EXEC. (Sept. 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/8CVC-NSK7 (stating that one-third of
surveyed men were reluctant to conduct one-on-one meetings with women).
390. See Hemel & Lund, supra note 24, at 1592 (considering the role that
corporate law can play in reducing workplace harassment).
391. See generally Katherine Tarbox, Is #MeToo Backlash Hurting
Women’s Opportunities in Finance?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 12, 2018), https://
perma.cc/Q232-5T22 (examining subtle forms of exclusion following #MeToo).
392. See Williams & Lebsock, supra note 38 (explaining how professional
exclusion violates federal antidiscrimination law).
393. See Hemel & Lund, supra note 24, at 1675 (discussing backlash
concerns associated with antidiscrimination expansions).
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reveal limitations of antidiscrimination law, not with strict
liability per se.394 In addition, a common argument against
expanding many antidiscrimination protections has long
asserted that increasing protections for various groups will
cause employers to exclude those groups.395 But there is simply
no justification in law or policy to avoid enforcing Title VII
simply because some actors might engage in additional Title VII
violations.396 The theoretical costs of this proposal (i.e.,
increased denial of mentorship and advancement opportunities
for women) must be weighed against the known costs of the
harassment
loophole
(i.e.,
widespread,
unremedied
harassment). Given the recognized harms associated with the
status quo, the fear that some managers might engage in
additional forms of sex discrimination cannot justify continuing
to maintain a legal rule that provides employers with safe
harbor from harassment liability.
D.

Policing Minor Transgressions and Ongoing Title VII
Limitations

Critics could argue that the current proposal is both
overinclusive and underinclusive. As to the former critique,
some observers might disfavor expanded liability because of the
burden that it would place on employers to answer for even
minor employee transgressions.397 After all, if courts required
employers to pay for every instance of workplace harassment,
394. See Goldberg, supra note 39, at 805 (examining forms of subtle
discrimination); Sturm, supra note 39, at 468 (outlining antidiscrimination
law’s role in perpetuating the exclusion of nondominant groups).
395. See Hemel & Lund, supra note 24, 1674–75 (discounting the
argument that the law should not penalize executives for engaging in illegal
behavior because they might engage in other illegal behavior).
396. See id. (arguing for enforcement of Title VII despite arguments that
enforcement might cause employers to exclude women from the workplace);
Patrick S. Shin, Liability for Unconscious Discrimination? A Thought
Experiment in the Theory of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 HASTINGS
L.J. 67, 85 (2010) (summarizing the argument that increased employer
liability for unconscious bias will harm statutorily protected groups).
397. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 8, at 69–70 (examining the consequences
of expanding harassment training).
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then what would prevent disgruntled workers from suing their
firms even for trivial claims? But despite this understandable
fear of overreach, several doctrinal features of Title VII would
mediate against excessive employer exposure.
Even with automatic liability in place, the law of sexual
harassment would still require plaintiffs to prove that their
mistreatment was both “unwelcome” and “severe or
pervasive.”398 Scholars have criticized these standards for
narrowly defining the meaning of harassment and for unfairly
focusing on victims’ behavior with the “unwelcome” analysis.399
Without endorsing either proof requirement, this proposal
simply acknowledges the widely held view that these rules
represent high hurdles to overcome for harassment plaintiffs.400
In many cases, federal judges have famously concluded that
plaintiffs did not experience “severe or pervasive” abuse even
when they were threatened, groped, or assaulted.401 Closing the
harassment loophole would not lower this considerable
threshold for proving harassment. Thus, even with a rule of
strict liability, Title VII would still require employers to answer

398. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (“Conduct that
is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive
work environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview.”); Baker, supra note 153, at
220–21 (discussing proof requirements for harassment claims).
399. See SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S
COURTS UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW 2 (2017) (examining the dismissal of
harassment claims that were not “sufficiently serious to be considered
discrimination”); Estrich, supra note 38, at 827–47 (critiquing both the
“unwelcome” and “severe or pervasive” requirement); Larson, supra note 313,
at 131 (asserting that an analysis of “unwelcomeness” encourages courts to
scrutinize victim behavior).
400. See Estrich, supra note 38, at 843 (discussing the challenge of
establishing facts that constitute legally cognizable harassment); see also
Davis, supra note 60, at 1063 (analyzing Title VII’s “demanding standard” for
proving harassment).
401. See SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 399, at 3–9 (summarizing
harassment decisions that resulted in dismissal); Hébert, supra note 6, at 330
(criticizing courts for “seemingly trying to outdo each other in finding truly
awful, demeaning conduct to be insufficiently abusive to be actionable”).
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only for the most severe forms of gender-based mistreatment at
work.402
In contrast to the charge that the present proposal is
overinclusive, some might claim that it does not go far enough
in light of other doctrinal impediments. For example, Title VII
has a short statute of limitations, limits victim recovery, and
does not even apply to small firms that employ fewer than
fifteen people.403 In addition, many employers force victims to
resolve their harassment claims in private arbitration or to sign
nondisclosure agreements.404 A rule of strict employer liability
would not change these very real shortcomings of employment
law.
But without discounting the practical and legal obstacles
that victims currently face, there are several reasons why a shift
toward strict employer liability could significantly improve the
legal landscape for harassment plaintiffs. First, advocacy
groups are currently attempting to parlay the awareness
created by #MeToo into broader structural and legal reforms.405
To the extent that this work prompts changes in state or federal
antidiscrimination laws, the proposal outlined here can
complement these ongoing reform efforts.406 Second, plaintiffs
currently lose their harassment claims at extremely high rates,
with employers receiving full or partial summary judgment in
the majority of federal harassment cases.407 Notice-based
liability substantially contributes to these losses because
402. Hébert, supra note 6, at 330 (describing the high bar for proving
sexual harassment).
403. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-5; see also Jane Byeff Korn, The
Fungible Woman and Other Myths of Sexual Harassment, 67 TUL. L. REV.
1363, 1378 (1993) (discussing various Title VII limitations).
404. See Hemel & Lund, supra note 24, at 1608–09 (examining the
prevalence of arbitration provisions in employment agreements).
405. See Murray, supra note 4, at 873–74, 874 n.219 (discussing how
advocates have engaged the state on issues related to sexual harassment).
406. See Farkas et al., supra note 54, at 464 (examining the Time’s Up
movement and legal responses to #MeToo); Mizrahi, supra note 41, at 128–42
(proposing state reforms in the wake of #MeToo).
407. See Chamallas, supra note 56, at 58 (observing that “very few
plaintiffs actually prevail” in court); State Regulation of Sexual Harassment,
supra note 54, at 465 (citing data on harassment litigation outcomes).
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employers overwhelmingly win when they deploy the
harassment loophole.408 Over 85 percent of individuals who
experience harassment never officially tell their employers
about the problem.409 Combined with the safe harbor provided
by notice-based liability, this pervasive silence means that the
vast majority of victims cannot obtain legal redress.410 Even if
legislators cured Title VII’s other deficiencies, the harassment
loophole would still allow courts and arbitrators to dismiss
harassment claims when victims fail to file internal complaints.
Given these practical and legal realities, closing the harassment
loophole represents one of the most impactful Title VII reforms
that advocates could advance.
CONCLUSION
What is the lasting impact of the #MeToo movement?
Although #MeToo has revealed patterns of widespread
harassment and enabled victims to come forward, the
movement has not yet altered the legal rules that allow sexual
harassment to flourish.411 In light of these circumstances,
#MeToo represents an extraordinary opportunity to listen, but
also a chance to initiate legal changes that can meaningfully
reduce harassment going forward.412
Closing the harassment loophole represents a tangible legal
solution to the workplace problems that #MeToo has identified.
Just as employers must automatically pay for all other Title VII
violations, they should pay for sexual harassment. This
development would not only harmonize antidiscrimination law,
it would advance the pressing goal of combating sexual
harassment in American workplaces.
408. See Grover, supra note 9, at 824 (summarizing studies on plaintiff
success rates in cases that involve the harassment loophole).
409. See FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 199, at 16 (summarizing victim
reporting rates).
410. See Chamallas, supra note 21, at 1322 (discussing embedded
structures that largely protect employers from harassment liability).
411. See Wexler et al., supra note 5, at 52 (examining the
antidiscrimination goals of remediation and punishment that advocates can
advance in the wake of #MeToo).
412. See Green, supra note 6, at 167–68 (outlining the need for more
effective legal solutions to the problem of harassment).

